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INTRODUCTION 
The Telecommunications Act of 19961 (“1996 Act”) revolu-
tionized telecommunications regulation in the United States. As 
part of this revolution, the Act transferred much of the states’ 
regulatory authority to the federal government in order to craft 
a new federal regime. Although the Act explicitly announced its 
removal of authority from the states,2 the Act does not address a 
critical question created by this new regulatory scheme: To what 
extent do state adjudications of federal telecommunications-
service regulation bind federal courts? The importance and diffi-
culty of answering this question should not be understated. On 
one hand, res judicata—which prevents litigants from having a 
second bite at the apple—has long been a cornerstone of the judi-
cial system in the United States.3 On the other, the radical chang-
es made by the Act require a uniform federal policy to accomplish 
their purpose of creating a competitive national telecommunica-
tions market. In addition, both the Act’s explicit restrictions on 
and its preservation of the states’ authority would be undermined 
by res judicata. The decisive question is whether Congress intend-
ed federal courts to be bound by state adjudications of the Act. 
 
 † BA 2012, The University of Kansas; JD Candidate 2016, The University of Chicago 
Law School. 
 1 Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, codified as amended in various sections of Titles 
15, 18, and 47.  
 2 See, for example, 47 USC § 253(a) (“No State or local statute or regulation, or 
other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the 
ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.”). 
 3 See San Remo Hotel, LP v City and County of San Francisco, California, 545 US 
323, 336–37 (2005) (describing the history and purpose of res judicata in the United 
States). 
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Careful examination of the Act’s history, purpose, and structure 
reveals that Congress did not. 
Before the 1996 Act, the telecommunications-service market 
was regulated—primarily by the individual states—as a natural 
monopoly.4 Congress’s passage of the Act reflected a recognition 
that competition in the telecommunications-service market was 
both possible and desirable. Congress intended the Act to spur 
the transition from monopoly to competition through the crea-
tion of a uniform national regulatory policy. Uniformity is essen-
tial because it corrects the critical flaws of prior monopoly regu-
lation: local and state protection of monopolists, and artificial 
rate setting that encouraged arbitrage and inefficiency. To im-
plement and maintain this uniform national regulatory policy, 
the Act transferred much of the states’ authority to the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC). The Act preserved the 
states’ authority only with regard to certain public-welfare issues 
and further mandated that states could regulate only in accord-
ance with federal law. Thus, the Act fundamentally restructured 
telecommunications regulation in two ways: by promoting compe-
tition as opposed to monopoly and by shifting primary regulatory 
responsibility from the states to the federal government. 
Courts have recognized these great changes wrought by the 
Act but have not resolved whether interpretations of the Act 
made through state adjudications bind federal courts. Federal 
courts accord state adjudications preclusive effect based on two 
different sources: federal common law (in the case of state agen-
cy adjudications) and 28 USC § 1738, the full faith and credit 
statute 5 (in the case of state court decisions). Federal common 
law may be overcome only if preclusion is inconsistent with con-
gressional intent.6 Section 1738 is inapplicable only if Congress 
has “clearly manifest[ed]” such intent—a similar but heightened 
standard.7 
To date, federal court decisions are inconsistent as to 
whether federal common law grants preclusive effect to state 
 
 4 See In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Tel-
ecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rec 15499, 15508 ¶ 11 (1996) (recognizing that the 
telecommunications-service market has been “traditionally . . . viewed as creating a natural 
monopoly”). A natural monopoly exists when one firm “can supply the market at lower cost 
than can two or more firms,” such that the market will naturally create a monopoly. Daniel 
F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 Yale J Reg 25, 31–32 (1995). 
 5 Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat 122, codified as amended at 28 USC § 1738. 
 6 See Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association v Solimino, 501 US 104, 108 (1991). 
 7 Kremer v Chemical Construction Corp, 456 US 461, 477 (1982). 
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agency adjudications; as for § 1738, courts have either applied it 
or avoided the issue altogether. Thorough examination of the 
Act, however, suggests that federal common law preclusion 
should not apply to state adjudications of federal law issues in-
volving the Act or to the regulation of telecommunications ser-
vices. Although implied repeal is rarely found,8 the Act never-
theless demonstrates strong qualities suggesting that partial 
implied repeal of § 1738 may in fact be possible as well. This 
Comment aims to demonstrate Congress’s intent that federal 
courts review federal law issues in this context—without being 
bound by prior state adjudications. Allowing state adjudications 
to preclude federal review would result in uneven and arbitrary 
implementation of federal telecommunications policy—the very 
problem that the Act was designed to solve.9 Furthermore, res 
judicata in this context would conflict with the Act’s explicit lim-
itations on state authority and undermine the Act’s preservation 
of state authority to regulate certain issues. Altogether, the Act’s 
purpose and provisions show that Congress did not intend for 
state adjudications to have preclusive effect in federal courts. 
Accordingly, neither federal common law preclusion nor § 1738 
should bar federal review. 
Without federal review, states could impede and upset both 
telecommunications-service competition and innovation. For ex-
ample, imagine that a new form of communication technology has 
arisen called quantum calling. Quantum calling uses quantum 
entanglement10 to make voice calls. A state agency decides 
through adjudication that quantum calling is a telecommunica-
tions service and is therefore subject to intrastate access charges. 
As a result, the cost of providing quantum calling (an already-
expensive service, given its reliance on cutting-edge technology) 
increases dramatically. Because of this increase, consumer de-
mand plummets and companies cancel plans to invest in and 
expand quantum-calling networks. If the state agency adjudica-
tion is res judicata, then neither the agency’s decision that it has 
 
 8 See Branch v Smith, 538 US 254, 293 (2003) (O’Connor concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (observing that the Supreme Court has “not found any implied repeal 
of a statute since 1975”) (emphasis in original). The Court has not found implicit repeal 
since Branch either. 
 9 See Part I.B. 
 10 Quantum entanglement is the linkage of the state of two atoms. It is theorized 
that quantum entanglement could allow for the transmission of information faster than 
the speed of light. See generally Zeeya Merali, Quantum ‘Spookiness’ Passes Toughest 
Test Yet, 525 Nature 15 (Sept 3, 2015).  
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the authority to make such a classification nor the classification 
itself can be challenged in federal court. Even if such decisions 
are blatant violations of federal law, a federal court will be pow-
erless to intervene. Ultimately, the goals of the 1996 Act—
increasing competition, reforming intercarrier compensation, 
and promoting universal service—are undermined, government 
intervention in the market creates inefficiency, and consumers 
suffer.11 
To understand and evaluate Congress’s intent, Part I details 
the history of telecommunications regulation. This includes the 
regulatory history prior to the Act, the purpose of the Act itself, 
and how the Act was designed to function. Part II sets forth the 
underpinnings of res judicata based on both the federal common 
law and § 1738. It lays out the courts’ current, inconsistent 
stances on the application of res judicata to state adjudications 
involving the Act. Building on this foundation, Part III examines 
whether the congressional intent embodied in the Act—namely, 
in the Act’s purpose, limitations on state authority, and preser-
vation of state authority—is consistent with giving state adjudi-
cations preclusive effect in federal court under either federal 
common law or § 1738. Finally, based on the evaluation of the 
Act in Part III, Part IV extrapolates the general characteristics 
that may indicate when res judicata is inapplicable to state ad-
judications of federal regulatory regimes. 
I.  THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 
The 1996 Act revolutionized telecommunications regulation 
in the United States. The Act’s three primary objectives were to 
increase local and long-distance competition, reform intercarrier 
compensation, and promote universal service.12 To accomplish 
these goals, the Act transferred regulatory authority from the 
states to the federal government in order to create and imple-
ment a uniform national regulatory scheme.13 Accordingly, the 
 
 11 While quantum calling may sound far-fetched, this hypothetical parallels the Iowa 
Utilities Board’s actual classification of voice-over-Internet-protocol calls as telecommu-
nications services and its approval of access charges. See Sprint Communications Co v 
Jacobs, 798 F3d 705, 706 (8th Cir 2015). 
 12 See In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rec 15499, 15505–07 ¶¶ 3, 6–8 (1996) (explain-
ing the goals of the reform and methods to accomplish them). 
 13 See 74 Am Jur 2d Telecomm § 15 at 298 (2012) (“Congress enacted the [Act] to 
provide a . . . deregulatory national policy framework . . . [and] reduce impediments to 
the development of telecommunication facilities imposed by local governments.”). 
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Act leaves states the authority to regulate intrastate telecom-
munications only so long as such regulations are consistent with 
the Act and federal policy.14 To fully understand the Act and the 
relationship it established between the federal government and 
the states, it is essential to understand both the history of tele-
communications regulation before the Act as well as the Act’s 
goals and structure.  
A. Telecommunications Regulation before the 1996 Act 
Prior to the Act, competition among local carriers was non-
existent.15 Telephone service was considered a natural monopo-
ly.16 AT&T had successfully convinced regulators that a single 
carrier was both necessary to achieve universal service—the 
provision of telephone service to all Americans—and more effi-
cient than competition.17 Thus, carriers (originally Bell Tele-
phone Company, and later AT&T and the regional Baby Bells18) 
became state-sanctioned monopolists who were regulated only to 
protect consumers from monopolist rent-seeking—not to ensure 
competition.19 Regulators set carriers’ rates based primarily on 
 
 14 See MCI Telecommunication Corp v Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, 271 F3d 491, 
497–98 (3d Cir 2001). See also 47 USC § 254(f) (prohibiting the states from adopting any 
regulations “inconsistent with the Commission’s rules to preserve and advance universal 
service”). 
 15 See MCI Telecommunication, 271 F3d at 498 (“In each local service area, the 
states would grant a monopoly franchise to one local exchange carrier.”). 
 16 See Glen O. Robinson and Thomas B. Nachbar, Communications Regulation 
439–41 (Thomson/West 2008) (outlining the history of telecommunications competition 
from the invention of the telephone until the 1930s). For a narrative history of the tele-
communications industry and telecommunications regulation, see generally Tim Wu, 
The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (Knopf 2010). 
 17 Robinson and Nachbar, Communications Regulation at 440–41 (cited in note 16). 
 18 The Bell Telephone Company’s monopoly over local and long-distance calls was 
broken up by court order in 1984. As a result, Bell’s long-distance service became AT&T, 
and its newly divested regional operating companies became known collectively as the 
Baby Bells. See Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Tele-
communications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications under Judge Greene, 50 Hastings 
L J 1395, 1404–20 (1999) (outlining the litigation history that broke up the company). 
 19 Robinson and Nachbar, Communications Regulation at 441 (cited in note 16). An 
example of monopoly regulation prior to the Act is rate of return regulation, which lim-
ited how much carriers could charge consumers. Such regulation sought only to prevent 
monopoly profits, not to ensure that rates were actually at competitive levels. Because 
the rates were designed not to mimic a competitive market but instead simply to control 
profits, rate of return regulation actually discouraged firms from engaging in the socially 
beneficial behaviors that come from competition. See In the Matter of Policy and Rules 
concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 FCC Rec 2873, 2889–90 ¶¶ 29–30 (1989) (dis-
cussing how rate regulation can lead firms to inefficiently increase investments in order 
to boost profits). See also Robinson and Nachbar, Communications Regulation at 480 
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carriers’ self-reported costs of providing service, meaning that 
higher costs resulted in higher profits.20 Unsurprisingly, such 
regulation led to widespread inefficiency and arbitrage.21 The 
FCC itself had no control over intrastate service;22 only states 
had the authority to grant exclusive rights in each local service 
area to a local carrier, who would then manage the entire local 
network.23 
At the same time, the intercarrier-compensation system was 
rife with inefficiencies due to ad hoc and uneven regulation. For 
any intrastate calls that were handled by more than one carri-
er—that is, for any calls in which the caller and the call recipi-
ent had different service providers—the caller’s network would 
pay the recipient’s carrier for the traffic.24 Most long-distance 
calls were also handled by multiple carriers—a local carrier 
would start the call, a long-distance carrier would transport the 
call to the recipient’s local network, and the recipient’s local net-
work would bring the call to its final destination.25 For these mul-
ticarrier calls, carriers would pay each other access charges for 
their specific roles in originating, transporting, and terminating 
the calls.26 Because of its artificially set rates, the intercarrier-
compensation system created boundless opportunities for carriers 
to engage in arbitrage and inefficient rent-seeking behavior.27 
This ad hoc intercarrier-compensation system was intended 
both to compensate carriers for their roles in the calls and to 
 
(cited in note 16) (describing the purpose of rate regulation as “protect[ing] consumers 
against monopoly overcharge”). 
 20 In the Matter of Policy and Rules concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 FCC 
Rec at 2889–90 ¶¶ 29–31. 
 21 See id (detailing how rate of return regulation incentivized carriers to engage in 
unnecessary or inefficient improvements and to allocate costs to their telecommunications 
services in order to boost carriers’ profits, because these profits were based on the cost to 
deliver services and regulators relied on carriers to report this information accurately). 
 22 See AT&T Corp v Iowa Utilities Board, 525 US 366, 403–04 (1999) (Thomas con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the limited authority that the FCC 
had to regulate interstate services prior to the 1996 Act). 
 23 Robinson and Nachbar, Communications Regulation at 556 (cited in note 16). 
 24 Id at 503–05. 
 25 Id at 503–04. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See In the Matter of Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rec 17663, 17669 ¶ 9 (2011) 
(“Over time, [intercarrier compensation] has become riddled with inefficiencies and oppor-
tunities for wasteful arbitrage.”). For example, because certain kinds of traffic were com-
pensated at higher rates, carriers were incentivized to artificially inflate traffic volume and 
to otherwise remove call information to avoid paying other carriers. See id at 17676 ¶ 33 
(detailing the FCC’s reforms taken to decrease the exploitation of the intercarrier-
compensation system). 
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subsidize carriers serving high-cost and rural areas as a means 
of ensuring that all Americans had access to telephone service.28 
The intercarrier-compensation system’s flaws, however, were 
fundamentally at odds with universal service.29 Artificial rate 
setting deterred carriers from moving to cheaper, more efficient 
Internet-protocol networks.30 The system also resulted in higher 
rates for small carriers, further incentivized carriers to engage 
in rent-seeking and arbitrage, and created costly compensation 
disputes.31 
B.  The 1996 Act 
Congress passed the 1996 Act to fundamentally restructure 
telecommunications-service markets. Through technological ad-
vances, it became apparent in the 1990s that competition was 
both possible and desirable.32 Local markets, however, were still 
dominated by state-sanctioned monopolies.33 At the same time, 
intercarrier compensation became widely regarded as extremely 
inefficient, both as a means for carriers to compensate each other 
and as a pathway to universal service.34 Accordingly, the Act was 
intended to open local and long-distance markets to competition, 
 
 28 Robinson and Nachbar, Communications Regulation at 529–30 (cited in note 16). 
 29 See In the Matter of Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rec at 17669 ¶ 9 (describing 
how the intercarrier-compensation system resulted in “millions of Americans paying 
more on their wireless and long distance bills than they should in the form of hidden, 
inefficient charges”). 
 30 Id (“The existing system . . . is also fundamentally in tension with and a deter-
rent to deployment of [Internet-protocol] networks. The system creates competitive dis-
tortions because traditional phone companies receive implicit subsidies from competitors 
for voice service, while wireless and other companies largely compete without the benefit 
of such subsidies.”). 
 31 See id (“[Intercarrier-compensation] revenues have become dangerously unstable, 
impeding investment, while costly disputes and arbitrage schemes have proliferated.”). 
 32 See Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995: Report of the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on S 652, S Rep No 104-23, 104th 
Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1995) (noting that “[c]hanges in technology and consumer preferences,” 
along with the emergence of competition, had made the previous regulatory regime “a 
historical anachronism”). See also Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, 29 Conn L Rev 123, 125–31 (1996) (describing the changes in technology and 
competition that led to the passage of the Act). 
 33 Robinson and Nachbar, Communications Regulation at 556–57 (cited in note 16). 
 34 See In the Matter of Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, 16 
FCC Rec 9610, 9616–18 ¶¶ 11–18 (2001); In the Matter of Access Charge Reform, 12 FCC 
Rec 15982, 15994–96 ¶¶ 28–31 (1997). 
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promote universal service, and reform intercarrier compensa-
tion—each goal essential to the success of the others.35 
First, Congress intended the Act to enhance competition.36 
The 1996 Act “requires that local service . . . be opened to com-
petition according to standards established by federal law.”37 
Congress imposed obligations on existing local carriers to permit 
new, competitive carriers to access their networks according to 
regulations set by the FCC.38 The Act preserves state access reg-
ulations only so long as they are consistent with the Act’s re-
quirements.39 The Act also places explicit restrictions on how 
states can regulate carriers because of concerns that state regu-
lation may undermine procompetitive federal policies.40 Specifi-
cally, the Act forbids states from enacting or enforcing any regu-
lation that “may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the 
ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate tele-
communications service.”41 
 
 35 See Robinson and Nachbar, Communications Regulation at 500–01 (cited in 
note 16). 
 36 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, S Rep No 104-230, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 1 
(1996) (describing the Act’s purpose to “open[ ] all telecommunications markets to com-
petition”). See also Verizon Maryland Inc v Public Service Commission of Maryland, 535 
US 635, 638 (2002) (describing how the Act was “designed to foster competition”). 
 37 MCI Telecommunication, 271 F3d at 497. 
 38 See 47 USC § 251. 
 39 See, for example, 47 USC § 253(d): 
If, after notice and an opportunity for public comment, the Commission deter-
mines that a State or local government has permitted or imposed any statute, 
regulation, or legal requirement that violates subsection (a) or (b) of this sec-
tion, the Commission shall preempt the enforcement of such statute, regula-
tion, or legal requirement to the extent necessary to correct such violation or 
inconsistency. 
 40 See Robinson and Nachbar, Communications Regulation at 556 (cited in note 16) 
(noting that, to achieve the Act’s goals, “it was considered necessary to develop a com-
prehensive federal scheme that in significant degree preempted state regulatory discre-
tion to the extent it might impede the overall congressional policy”). 
 41 47 USC § 253(a). See also, for example, Sprint Telephony PCS, LP v County of 
San Diego, 490 F3d 700, 715–16 (9th Cir 2007) (finding that 47 USC § 253(a) preempted 
a county ordinance that imposed onerous “permitting structure and design require-
ments”); City of Portland, Oregon v Electric Lightwave, Inc, 452 F Supp 2d 1049, 1062–
65 (D Or 2005) (holding that a city’s requirements that a carrier sell services to the city 
at the “most-favored rate” and allow the city to use the carrier’s ducts and cables violated 
§ 253(a)); TCG New York, Inc v City of White Plains, 305 F3d 67, 76–82 (2d Cir 2002) (in-
validating city ordinances and contract provisions that imposed burdensome disclosure 
requirements, mandated that carriers waive the ability to mount legal challenges, and 
required carriers to offer rates “on terms that [were] at least as good as the terms TCG 
offer[ed] to any other governmental or non-profit customer” in the area). 
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Second, the 1996 Act transformed universal-service funding 
by mandating the elimination of implicit intercarrier-
compensation subsidies. In place of these subsidies, Congress 
ordered the FCC to make federal universal-service support “ex-
plicit.”42 To accomplish this reform, the Act mandated the crea-
tion of the Federal-State Joint Board.43 The board—composed of 
federal regulators and state utility commissioners44—is tasked 
with creating universal-service reform recommendations accord-
ing to the principles of the Act.45 The Act requires the FCC to im-
plement the board’s recommendations.46 Moreover, the Act prohib-
its states from independently adopting any regulations 
“inconsistent with the Commission’s rules to preserve and advance 
universal service.”47 The states’ authority to adopt additional 
universal-service regulations is further restricted so that any reg-
ulation must be “specific” and “predictable,” and it must not “rely 
on or burden Federal universal service support mechanisms.”48 
Third, the Act created a new federal regime to manage in-
tercarrier compensation. Instead of paying each other access 
charges established by regulatory formulas,49 the 1996 Act re-
quires carriers to instead negotiate reciprocal-compensation 
agreements50 based on the actual costs of delivering traffic to one 
another.51 State agencies have the authority to arbitrate these 
agreements according to standards set by the Act.52 In addition, 
states are allowed to enforce their own laws when reviewing 
agreements only if doing so is in accordance with the Act.53 If a 
state fails to act, the FCC has the authority to step in and re-
view the agreement.54 
 
 42 47 USC § 254(e). 
 43 47 USC §§ 254(a), 410(c). 
 44 47 USC § 410(c). 
 45 47 USC § 254(a)(1), (b). 
 46 47 USC § 254(a)(2). 
 47 47 USC § 254(f). 
 48 47 USC § 254(f). 
 49 See Robinson and Nachbar, Communications Regulation at 503–05 (cited in note 
16) (describing the history of access-charge regulation prior to the Act). 
 50 47 USC § 251(b)(5), (c)(1). 
 51 47 USC § 252(d)(2)(A) (permitting state commissions to find that the terms of the 
reciprocal-compensation agreements are “just and reasonable” only if the costs are a 
“reasonable approximation” of the expected costs). 
 52 47 USC § 252(c) (listing the criteria that state agencies must apply when arbi-
trating interconnection agreements). 
 53 47 USC § 252(e)(3). 
 54 47 USC § 252(e)(5): 
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The components of the Act’s “trilogy” of goals—promoting 
competition, enhancing universal service, and reforming inter-
carrier compensation—are “integrally related.”55 For example, if 
universal-service funding is done improperly, it can create mar-
ket distortions by subsidizing inefficient or uncompetitive carri-
ers, thus harming the Act’s competition goals. Similarly, overly 
restrictive local regulation impedes the ability of competitive 
carriers to enter markets, in turn hindering universal service. 
Intercarrier compensation affects all of this as it can increase 
carriers’ costs of providing service, which can both harm univer-
sal service by decreasing carriers’ service provision and decrease 
competition by limiting carriers’ entry into new markets.56 Ac-
cordingly, “[o]nly when all parts of the trilogy are complete will 
the task of adjusting the regulatory framework to fully competi-
tive markets be finished.”57 
Congress intended the federal courts and the FCC to over-
see and manage this new regulatory system.58 States are left 
with the authority to regulate only intrastate retail-level ser-
vices, and even then only in accordance with federal policy.59 
Furthermore, the Act gives the FCC the authority to preempt any 
state and local laws that impede competition,60 allows aggrieved 
 
If a State commission fails to act to carry out its responsibility under this section 
in any proceeding or other matter under this section, then the Commission shall 
issue an order preempting the State commission’s jurisdiction of that proceeding 
or matter within 90 days after being notified (or taking notice) of such failure, 
and shall assume the responsibility of the State commission under this section 
with respect to the proceeding or matter and act for the State commission. 
 55 In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rec at 15505–07 ¶¶ 3–8 (discussing the goals of the 
1996 Act). 
 56 See In the Matter of Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, 16 
FCC Rec at 9623 ¶¶ 31–32. See also Part III.A (describing how altering the congressional 
scheme would likely impact the Act’s ability to achieve Congress’s goals). 
 57 In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rec at 15507 ¶ 9.  
 58 See Southwestern Bell Telephone Co v Connect Communications Corp, 225 F3d 942, 
948 (8th Cir 2000) (concluding that Congress intended federal courts to have jurisdiction to 
review federal law issues related to the Act in the interests of federal uniformity); AT&T 
Corp, 525 US at 378 n 6 (finding that Congress intended the federal courts and the FCC to 
oversee and manage telecommunications-service regulation under the Act). 
 59 See 47 USC §§ 251(d)(3), 252(e)(3), 253(a)–(b), 254(f). See also Global NAPs, Inc v 
Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy, 427 F3d 34, 46–48 (1st 
Cir 2005) (describing the authority left to the states and the federal government’s “ex-
tensive oversight role”). 
 60 47 USC § 253(d) (“If . . . the Commission determines that a State or local govern-
ment has permitted or imposed any statute, regulation, or legal requirement that violates 
 2016] Res Judicata, State Adjudications, and the 1996 Act 903 
 
parties to seek federal review of certain state agency decisions,61 
and grants federal courts subject matter jurisdiction to review 
state compliance with the Act.62 
This federal supervision is necessary to accomplish the goals 
of the Act because it allows for the creation of a uniform system. 
State-by-state regulation is inefficient and costly.63 States are 
ineffective regulators of telecommunications services for a varie-
ty of reasons. First, modern telecommunications services, and 
the carriers that provide such services, are inherently inter-
state.64 State-by-state regulation of these national networks and 
carriers is therefore incomplete.65 Second, state-by-state regula-
tion increases carriers’ compliance costs, because carriers must 
keep track of and work with fifty different state regulators and 
regulatory regimes.66 Regulatory uncertainty and instability re-
duce carrier investment and innovation.67 Finally, the “most 
fundamental problem” with state-by-state regulation is that 
 
. . . this section, the Commission shall preempt [its] enforcement . . . to the extent neces-
sary to correct such violation or inconsistency.”). 
 61 47 USC § 252(e)(6) (“In any case in which a State commission makes a determi-
nation under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may bring an ac-
tion in an appropriate Federal district court.”). 
 62 See Verizon Maryland, 535 US at 643–44. 
 63 See AT&T Corp, 525 US at 378 n 6. See also Charles J. Cooper and Brian Stuart 
Koukoutchos, Federalism and the Telephone: The Case for Preemptive Federal Deregula-
tion in the New World of Intermodal Competition, 6 J Telecomm & High Tech L 293, 
343–59 (2008) (asserting that “state-by-state regulation is fundamentally incompatible 
with modern wireline telephony” and that as a result the remaining state regulatory au-
thority “must be carefully policed by the FCC and the federal courts”). 
 64 See Cooper and Koukoutchos, 6 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 344–54 (cited in 
note 63) (noting that new technological innovations, such as wireless communications 
systems and high-speed data access, have increased intermodal competition, have de-
creased the importance of state and regional boundaries, and require a federal regulato-
ry solution rather than a state one). 
 65 Id at 353–54 (arguing that state regulation of national industries imposes nega-
tive externalities on other consumers, and asserting that telecommunications-service 
regulation is incompatible with a state-by-state regulatory regime because telecommuni-
cations operators no longer operate on a state-by-state basis). 
 66 See id at 352–55 (showing that the FCC found inconsistent regulation of the ca-
ble industry to damper investment and reasoning that a lack of “regulatory uniformity” 
will decrease capital investment for telephony). See also Communications Act of 1995, 
HR Rep 104-204(I), 104th Cong, 1st Sess 94 (1995): 
The Committee finds that current State and local requirements . . . have created 
an inconsistent and, at times, conflicting patchwork of requirements which will 
inhibit the deployment of [advanced services]. . . . The Committee believes it is in 
the national interest that uniform, consistent requirements, with adequate safe-
guards of the public health and safety, be established as soon as possible. 
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states are unable to manage and address externalities that ex-
tend beyond state boundaries.68 
For example, if one state or locality enacts regulation that 
hinders competition—such as by denying a carrier a permit to 
build cellular towers in a new market—it can negatively impact 
competition in other areas.69 If states and localities regulate in 
such a way that creates competitive advantages for one carrier, 
then that carrier can use those benefits either to cross subsidize 
its services in other, more competitive markets, or to extract 
monopoly profits through the creation of a terminating-access 
monopoly. These incidental advantages afforded to some carriers 
through inconsistent regulation in local markets can therefore 
have a broader impact on other localities and states.70 
It is important to note, however, that the Act does not require 
complete uniformity in all telecommunications regulation. Only 
the overarching national policies regarding competition, inter-
carrier compensation, and universal service must be uniform. 
The Act explicitly leaves states the authority to implement their 
own individual regulations so long as they do not interfere with 
federal policies.71 Thus, the Act can most appropriately be 
thought of as setting the federal framework that the states must 
operate within—a framework broad enough in some respects 
that states may even take varying approaches to similar is-
sues.72 Accordingly, from the beginning the FCC has character-
ized the 1996 Act as “craft[ing] a partnership . . . under [which] 
the FCC establishes uniform national rules for some issues, the 
states, and in some instances the FCC, administer these rules, 
 
 67 See Cooper and Koukoutchos, 6 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 352 (cited in note 63).  
 68 Id at 353–54 (noting not only that state regulation will impose costs on other 
nonstate users but also that state regulators lack an incentive to take such costs into ac-
count when making decisions). 
 69 See id. 
 70 See id (asserting that the “fundamental problem with [ ] state regulation” is the 
states’ inability to understand and address externalities). 
 71 See, for example, 47 USC § 253(b): 
Nothing in this section shall affect the ability of a State to impose, on a compet-
itively neutral basis and consistent with section 254 of this title, requirements 
necessary to preserve and advance universal service, protect the public safety 
and welfare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunications services, and 
safeguard the rights of consumers. 
 72 See Global NAPs, 427 F3d at 46 (“The model under the [Act] is to divide authori-
ty among the FCC and the state commissions in an unusual regime of ‘cooperative feder-
alism,’ with the intended effect of leaving state commissions free, where warranted, to 
reflect the policy choices made by their states.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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and the states adopt additional rules that are critical to promot-
ing local telephone competition.”73 
In sum, the 1996 Act embodies Congress’s goal of trans-
forming the telecommunications-service market by establishing 
national regulations that encourage competition, reform inter-
carrier compensation, and strengthen universal service. To ac-
complish these tasks, the Act emboldened the federal govern-
ment and federal courts to oversee and manage this new regime. 
Furthermore, the Act mandated that the limited discretion re-
tained by the states be exercised only in accordance with federal 
policy. 
II.  THE UNRESOLVED ISSUE OF RES JUDICATA AND THE 1996 ACT 
Although the courts have decided many issues related to the 
1996 Act, it is unresolved whether state adjudications of the Act 
preclude review in federal court. The doctrine of res judicata 
holds that once a claim or issue has been litigated, such judg-
ment is final and may not be relitigated.74 Res judicata “re-
lieve[s] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, 
conserve[s] judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent 
decisions, encourage[s] reliance on adjudication.”75 When federal 
courts apply res judicata effect to state judgments, the doctrine 
“also promote[s] the comity between state and federal courts.”76 
Federal courts generally apply res judicata to state adjudica-
tions in two different ways. First, federal common law determines 
the preclusive effect of state agency adjudications in federal 
court.77 Under the common law, a basic presumption of preclusion 
applies unless preclusion of federal review would conflict with 
 
 73 In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rec at 15513 ¶ 24.  
 74 See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 18 Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 4401 at 4 (West 2d ed 2002 & Supp 2015). Note that claim pre-
clusion (which prevents parties to litigation and their privies from relitigating a specific 
claim) and issue preclusion (which bars other parties from relitigating a legal issue) are 
two different forms of res judicata. Issue preclusion is also known as “collateral estop-
pel,” which is occasionally referred to as being distinct from res judicata. Res judicata, 
however, may include both claim preclusion and collateral estoppel. See id at § 4402 at 8. 
 75 Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 94 (1980). 
 76 Id at 96, citing Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 43–45 (1971).  
 77 See Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association v Solimino, 501 US 104, 107–
09 (1991). 
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Congress’s intent.78 The courts are divided on whether federal 
common law preclusion applies to claims involving the 1996 Act 
or other federal law.79 
Second, the full faith and credit statute, § 1738, mandates 
that federal courts afford state court judgments the same pre-
clusive effect that those judgments would have in state court. 
Section 1738 is inapplicable only if a subsequent statute con-
tains either an explicit or implied partial repeal. Implicit repeal 
requires that the subsequent statute clearly manifest Congress’s 
intent and that it create an irreconcilable conflict with § 1738.80 
Aside from one instance in which the court avoided the issue, all 
federal courts have applied § 1738 and res judicata to state court 
judgments involving the Act.81 The courts, however, have yet to 
be squarely presented with the question whether the Act implic-
itly repeals § 1738. 
To explain the current state of the law on these issues, Part 
II.A discusses federal common law preclusion and the courts’ 
treatment of common-law preclusion in relation to the 1996 Act. 
Part II.B then examines the courts’ application of § 1738 to the Act. 
A.  State Agency Adjudications, Federal Common Law, and the 
Courts’ Inconsistent Applications of Res Judicata 
Federal common law governs the preclusive effect of state 
agency adjudications in federal court.82 To determine whether 
 
 78 See id at 109–10 (applying a general presumption of preclusive effect to state 
agency adjudications when “Congress has failed expressly or impliedly to evince any in-
tention on the issue”). 
 79 Compare Global NAPs, Inc v Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications 
and Energy, 427 F3d 34, 48–49 (1st Cir 2005), with Verizon Maryland Inc v RCN Tele-
com Services, Inc, 232 F Supp 2d 539, 548–50 (D Md 2002), revd in part on other 
grounds, Verizon Maryland, Inc v Global NAPs, Inc, 377 F3d 355, 369 (4th Cir 2004) 
(holding that preclusion does not bar judicial review). 
 80 See Posadas v National City Bank, 296 US 497, 503 (1936): 
There are two well-settled categories of repeals by implication—(1) where pro-
visions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent 
of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the lat-
er act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a 
substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act. 
 81 See Part II.B. See also Sprint Communications Co v Jacobs, 798 F3d 705, 707–09 
(8th Cir 2015). 
 82 See University of Tennessee v Elliott, 478 US 788, 794 (1986): 
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 governs the preclusive effect to be given the judgments and 
records of state courts, and is not applicable to the unreviewed state administra-
tive factfinding at issue in this case. However,  we have frequently fashioned fed-
eral common-law rules of preclusion in the absence of a governing statute. 
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the federal common law requires res judicata, “the question is 
not whether administrative estoppel is wise but whether it is in-
tended by the legislature.”83 Thus, to overcome federal common 
law preclusion, parties must show that “a common-law rule of 
preclusion would be [in]consistent with Congress’ intent in en-
acting [the statute].”84 Using this analysis, the Supreme Court 
has held that state agency decisions do not preclude racial dis-
crimination claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 196485 or claims brought under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967,86 but it has held that they bar actions 
brought under 42 USC § 1983.87 Circuit courts have interpreted 
the Supreme Court’s precedent to mean that federal common 
law preclusion can be overcome “if the effect of the state court 
judgment or decree is to restrain the exercise of the United 
States’ sovereign power by imposing requirements that are con-
trary to important and established federal policy.”88 
Since the passage of the 1996 Act, federal courts have dif-
fered widely in their applications of res judicata to state agency 
adjudications related to the Act. In AT&T Corp v Iowa Utilities 
Board,89 the Supreme Court addressed federal review of state 
agency decisions in a footnote.90 The primary issue in the case was 
whether the FCC’s methodology to set interconnection rates 
was reasonable.91 In turn, this hinged on whether the FCC had 
the authority to issue rules setting intrastate rates.92 While 
both parties agreed that the 1996 Act preempted most state 
 
 83 Astoria, 501 US at 108. 
 84 Id at 110, quoting Elliott, 478 US at 796. 
 85 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e et seq. 
 86 Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602, codified as amended at 29 USC § 621 et seq.  
 87 Compare Elliott, 478 US at 795–96 (holding that state agency decisions did not 
preclude federal review of Title VII claims), and Astoria, 501 US at 112–14 (holding that 
Congress did not intend for state judgments to have preclusive effect under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act), with Elliott, 478 US at 797–99 (finding that for § 1983 
claims “federal courts must give the agency’s factfinding the same preclusive effect to 
which it would be entitled in the State’s courts”). 
 88 Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority v Federal Aviation Administration, 
242 F3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir 2001). See also American Airlines, Inc v Department of 
Transportation, 202 F3d 788, 800–01 (5th Cir 2000) (holding that state court rulings 
were not preclusive, because the federal interest in consistent aviation laws was strong 
enough to overcome the application of the “full faith and credit principles”). 
 89 525 US 366 (1999).  
 90 Id at 378 n 6. 
 91 Id at 374 & n 3.  
 92 Id at 374.  
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regulation,93 they disputed whether that preemption extended 
to local rate setting. AT&T contended that the plain language of 
the Act granted the FCC such authority under 47 USC § 251,94 
while the Iowa Utilities Board asserted that the Act left the 
states with authority over local rate setting and otherwise failed 
to express sufficient intent to overcome the presumption in favor 
of local regulation of public welfare.95 To resolve this issue, the 
Court examined the Act’s division of authority between the 
states and the federal government. The Court found that “a fed-
eral program administered by 50 independent state agencies is 
surpassing strange.”96 The Court further explained that “[t]his 
is, at bottom, a debate not about whether the States will be al-
lowed to do their own thing, but about whether it will be the 
FCC or the federal courts that draw the lines to which they must 
hew.”97 Ultimately, the Court concluded that “if the federal 
courts believe a state commission is not regulating in accordance 
with federal policy they may bring it to heel.”98 
Consistent with AT&T Corp, both the First and the Eighth 
Circuits have held that state agency adjudications related to the 
interpretation and application of the 1996 Act do not bar federal 
review. In Global NAPs, Inc v Massachusetts Department of Tel-
ecommunications and Energy,99 the First Circuit considered 
whether an interpretation of an interconnection agreement by 
the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission bound other state 
agencies under federal common law.100 The court engaged in de-
tailed analysis of the Act’s purpose as well as its structure.101 
The court found that one of the “overriding aims of the [Act] was 
to introduce competition into the market for local telephone ser-
vice,” which had previously been dominated by state-regulated 
 
 93 Compare Brief of Petitioners AT&T et al, AT&T Corp v Iowa Utilities Board, 
Docket No 97-826, *20–32 (US filed Apr 3, 1998) (available on Westlaw at 1998 WL 
401522) (“Petitioners’ Brief”), with Joint Brief for State Commission Respondents and 
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, AT&T Corp v Iowa Utili-
ties Board, Docket No 97-826, *16 (US filed May 18, 1998) (available on Westlaw at 1998 
WL 267886) (“Respondents’ Brief”). 
 94 See Petitioners’ Brief at *20–32 (cited in note 93). 
 95 See Respondents’ Brief at *14–42 (cited in note 93). 
 96 AT&T Corp, 525 US at 378 n 6.  
 97 Id.  
 98 Id.  
 99 427 F3d 34 (1st Cir 2005). 
 100 Id at 35. 
 101 Id at 36–37.  
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monopolists.102 The court noted that although Congress limited 
the states’ abilities to act inconsistently with federal policy,103 
the Act otherwise preserved the states’ abilities to enforce and 
administer their own laws.104 In addition, the court found that 
Congress both gave the federal government “an extensive over-
sight role” and vested the FCC with the authority to craft a fed-
eral regulatory regime that the states are required to follow.105 
Accordingly, the court concluded that “general implementation 
of default common law issue preclusion rules” would “threaten” 
both the authority preserved for the individual states and “the 
authority allocated to the FCC” under the Act.106 
In addition to its concerns about contravening Congress’s in-
tent, the First Circuit noted that “[a] judicially imposed rule of 
preclusion here would also set up an opportunity for regulatory 
arbitrage contrary to the purposes of the [Act].”107 Carriers often 
use interstate interconnection agreements that contain identical 
terms.108 If preclusion applied, then the first state agency (or 
court) to interpret those terms would bind all other states.109 
This would incentivize carriers to “race” to have terms inter-
preted as favorably as possible and would pressure state agen-
cies to decide these issues quickly in order to preserve their own 
autonomy.110 Such results would “cut directly against Congress’s 
desire, as evinced by the text and structure of the [Act],” to pre-
serve individual state autonomy over certain intrastate issues.111 
Based on this understanding of the Act, the First Circuit held 
that common-law issue preclusion did not apply.112 The court, 
however, limited its holding to the specific circumstances of the 
case at hand and did not address whether the Act completely 
displaces all federal common law preclusion.113 
 
 102 Id at 36.  
 103 Global NAPs, 427 F3d at 46–47.  
 104 Id (noting that the “intended effect” of the Act was to “leav[e] state commissions 
free, where warranted, to reflect the policy choices made by their states”).  
 105 Id at 47.  
 106 Id.  
 107 Global NAPs, 427 F3d at 48. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Global NAPs, 427 F3d at 48.   
 112 Id at 45, 49. 
 113 Id at 48–49.  
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Similarly, in Iowa Network Services, Inc v Qwest Corp,114 the 
Eighth Circuit considered whether an adjudication by the Iowa 
Utilities Board about a traffic-classification decision barred federal 
review.115 Examining the Act, the court found that Congress 
“ha[d] inserted both the Federal Communications Commission 
[ ] and the federal courts into the previously state-regulated mo-
nopoly.”116 Furthermore, “Congress was well aware” of the previ-
ous split of telecommunications services between the states and 
the federal government and had “specifically delegated to feder-
al district courts” the authority to review state agency decisions 
related to interconnection agreements under 47 USC 
§ 252(e)(6).117 Even though the issue before the court did not im-
plicate § 252(e)(6), the court found that the agency’s decision 
was still reviewable by a federal court because preclusion would 
contradict Congress’s intent that issues related to §§ 251–52 be 
resolved in federal court.118 After examining the Act, the Eighth 
Circuit was “convince[d]” that “Congress intended to supplant 
the common law principles of claim preclusion when it enacted 
the 1996 Act”119 and concluded that “[f]ederal courts have the ul-
timate power to interpret provisions of the 1996 Act.”120 Thus, 
the court held that federal common law preclusion did not apply 
to state agency adjudications of the Act.121 
The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, has noted in dicta that federal 
common law preclusion does apply to state agency adjudications 
of the Act. In Communications Telesystems International v Cali-
fornia Public Utility Commission,122 the plaintiff argued that 
sanctions imposed by the California Public Utilities Commission 
violated the Act.123 After adjudication by the state commission, 
 
 114 363 F3d 683 (8th Cir 2004). 
 115 Id at 688–89. 
 116 Id at 691, quoting Illinois Bell Telephone Co v Worldcom Technologies, Inc, 179 
F3d 566, 568 (7th Cir 1999). 
 117 Iowa Network Services, 363 F3d at 691, citing 47 USC § 252(e)(6). 
 118 Iowa Network Services, 363 F3d at 691–94 (recognizing that “[t]o hold that the 
district court was bound by the [state agency’s] determinations in this case, but allow the 
district court in the companion case to reach the federal issues, could result in an incon-
sistency we cannot condone”). 
 119 Id at 690.  
 120 Id at 692. 
 121 Id at 693. The Eighth Circuit recently confirmed its stance on this issue. See 
Sprint Communications, 798 F3d at 708 (“In light of our holding in Iowa Network Ser-
vices, we conclude that Congress did not intend that issue-preclusion principles bar 
federal-court review of the issue involved here.”). 
 122 196 F3d 1011 (9th Cir 1999). 
 123 Id at 1015. 
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the plaintiff appealed to the California Supreme Court, which de-
clined review.124 As a result, the only res judicata issue in Com-
munications Telesystems was whether the California Supreme 
Court’s refusal to hear the appeal constituted a final judgment 
on the merits.125 In passing, however, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that state agency adjudications are entitled to preclusive effect 
in federal courts126—suggesting that res judicata would still ap-
ply even if the state agency decision had not been reviewed by a 
state court. A variety of district courts have also held that state 
agency decisions are res judicata without examining congres-
sional intent.127 However, the issue of whether Congress intend-
ed state agencies to bind federal courts was not directly before 
any of these courts. 
Altogether, federal courts have diverged over whether state 
agency adjudications preclude federal review. The First and 
Eighth Circuits have both directly held that federal common law 
does not accord preclusive effect to state agency decisions on the 
specific issues that have been presented to them. Conversely, 
the Ninth Circuit and multiple district courts have either noted 
in dicta or directly held that federal common law preclusion does 
apply. As a result, whether federal common law preclusion ap-
plies to state agency interpretations of the Act is a pressing is-
sue that remains unresolved. 
B.  State Court Judgments, § 1738, and the Unexamined Issue 
of Implicit Repeal 
Federal common law, however, is not the end of the debate 
on whether state adjudications bar federal review of claims 
 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id at 1017–19. 
 126 Communications Telesystems, 196 F3d at 1018, citing Elliott, 478 US at 799 (as-
serting that “quasi-judicial state administrative proceedings” should be granted the 
same preclusive effect in federal courts as is granted to state court judgments).  
 127 See, for example, Ohio Bell Telephone Co v Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 
844 F Supp 2d 873, 880–85 (SD Ohio 2012) (“[T]he Court finds that AT & T’s challenge 
to [the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio’s] determination that Intrado provides ‘tele-
phone exchange service’ for the purpose of compelling interconnection pursuant to Sec-
tion 251(c)(2) . . . is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion.”); McLeodUSA Telecom-
munications Services, Inc v Arizona Corp Commission, 655 F Supp 2d 1003, 1017–18 (D 
Ariz 2009) (“The court can perceive no reason why the Commission’s decision as to the 
issue of the rates for DC power plant made in the Cost Docket should not be given pre-
clusive effect.”); Verizon Maryland, 232 F Supp 2d at 548–50 (noting that a state agen-
cy’s interpretation of the Act would be res judicata but for the fact that the state agency 
had waived its res judicata defense). 
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involving the 1996 Act. Section 1738 mandates that state court 
proceedings have the same preclusive effect in federal court as 
they would have in state court.128 For res judicata to not apply to 
a state court decision, § 1738 must be either explicitly or implic-
itly repealed by a subsequent statute.129 Implicit repeals are dis-
favored, such that there must be “irreconcilable conflict” be-
tween § 1738 and the subsequent statute.130 Accordingly, 
“[r]epeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make 
the [later enacted law] work.”131 In other words, “Congress must 
‘clearly manifest’ its intent to depart from § 1738.”132 As a result, 
implicit repeal of § 1738 is similar to the overcoming of federal 
common law preclusion; the analysis for both hinges on congres-
sional intent. The difference, however, is that implicit repeal of 
§ 1738 requires Congress’s intent to be “clearly manifest,”133 a 
standard that is rarely met.134 Under this heightened standard, 
the Supreme Court has held that § 1983, Title VII, and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934135 each did not repeal § 1738.136 
The only instance when the Supreme Court has found im-
plicit repeal of § 1738 was in Brown v Felsen,137 which concerned 
the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act138 (“1970 Amend-
ments”).139 The 1970 Amendments “require[d] creditors to apply 
 
 128 28 USC § 1738. 
 129 Kremer v Chemical Construction Corp, 456 US 461, 468 (1982), citing Allen, 449 
US at 99 (“[A]n exception to § 1738 will not be recognized unless a later statute contains 
an express or implied partial repeal.”). 
 130 Kremer, 456 US at 468, quoting Radzanower v Touche Ross & Co, 426 US 148, 
154 (1976).  
 131 Radzanower, 426 US at 155, quoting Silver v New York Stock Exchange, 373 US 
341, 357 (1963) (brackets in original). 
 132 Kremer, 456 US at 477. See also San Remo Hotel, LP v City and County of San 
Francisco, California, 545 US 323, 345 (2005). 
 133 San Remo, 545 US at 345. 
 134 See Branch v Smith, 538 US 254, 293 (2003) (O’Connor concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (observing that the Court had not found implicit repeal since 1975). 
 135 48 Stat 881, codified as amended at 15 USC § 78a et seq. 
 136 See Allen, 449 US at 104–05 (holding that § 1983 is subject to issue preclusion 
under § 1738); Migra v Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 US 75, 83–
84 (1984) (holding that claim preclusion in addition to issue preclusion occurs under 
§ 1983); Kremer, 456 US at 476–78 (applying res judicata to Title VII claims); Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co v Epstein, 516 US 367, 381–86 (1996) (holding that a state court’s 
approval of a class action settlement under the Securities Exchange Act barred future 
federal claims brought under the same statute). 
 137 442 US 127 (1979). 
 138 Pub L No 91-466, 84 Stat 990. 
 139 Brown, 442 US at 135–36. Note that the Court did not explicitly mention § 1738 
in Brown, but it later acknowledged that Brown functionally held that § 1738 was im-
plicitly repealed. See Matsushita, 516 US at 380–81. Even though Brown did not discuss 
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to the [federal] bankruptcy court for adjudication of certain dis-
chargeability questions.”140 At issue in Brown was whether a 
state court’s judgment deciding underlying factual issues was 
binding on the federal bankruptcy court.141 During the state 
court proceeding, the creditor and debtor had stipulated that the 
debtor owed the creditor, without specifying the basis for liabil-
ity.142 Now in federal bankruptcy court, the debtor asserted that 
his debt was dischargeable because his debt was based on 
fraudulent misrepresentations by the creditor.143 The creditor 
countered that the state court’s judgment was res judicata and 
bound the federal bankruptcy court.144 Despite the fact that the 
1970 Amendments did not explicitly address res judicata, the 
Court held that res judicata did not apply.145 The Court found 
that allowing state courts to decide the issue would frustrate 
Congress’s intent to have such dischargeability issues resolved 
in bankruptcy courts, because the 1970 Amendments were 
meant to both protect debtors and put these issues in the hands 
of bankruptcy courts with greater expertise.146 
Given the rarity of an implied repeal of § 1738, it is unsur-
prising that a variety of courts have applied § 1738 to state court 
decisions that interpreted the 1996 Act. However, these courts 
have neither dealt with challenges that the Act implicitly re-
peals § 1738 nor addressed whether Congress intended state 
court judgments to preclude federal review. The Ninth Circuit is 
the only federal court of appeals to discuss whether § 1738 ap-
plies to the 1996 Act. However, the only issue presented to the 
Ninth Circuit in Communications Telesystems was, as noted 
above, whether the California Supreme Court’s summary denial 
 
§ 1738 or its implicit repeal, the Court has recognized that its analysis is appropriate for 
both. See Marrese v American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 US 373, 386 (1985) 
(citing Brown to demonstrate that congressional intent is “the primary consideration” in 
determining whether § 1738 is implicitly repealed). Scholars have also treated Brown’s 
holding this way. See, for example, Jon T. Alexander, Issue Preclusion, Full Faith and 
Credit, and Default Judgments: A Dilemma for the Bankruptcy Courts, 44 UCLA L Rev 
159, 186–87 (1996) (asserting that “Brown can now be properly viewed as based on an 
implied statutory exception in the 1970 bankruptcy amendments to the operation of 
§ 1738, at least with regard to state law that would mandate claim preclusion”) (citation 
omitted).  
 140 Brown, 442 US at 129–30.  
 141 Id.  
 142 Id at 128–29.  
 143 Id at 129.  
 144 Brown, 442 US at 129. 
 145 Id at 135–37.  
 146 Id at 135–36.  
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was a final judgment on the merits.147 The Ninth Circuit did not 
discuss either whether the Act implicitly repealed § 1738 or 
Congress’s intent. As a result, the court flatly applied § 1738 
and denied federal review of the issue.148 District courts address-
ing the issue have so far all held that § 1738 bars federal review, 
but they have done so without evaluating whether the Act im-
plicitly repeals § 1738.149 
More recently, the Eighth Circuit had the opportunity to 
consider the application of § 1738 to the 1996 Act in Sprint 
Communications Co v Jacobs.150 In that case, the Iowa Utilities 
Board decided that voice-over-Internet-protocol calls were tele-
communications services and that Sprint was therefore required 
to pay other carriers for the traffic it received.151 The district 
court dismissed Sprint’s claims related to the Act because a 
state court had already heard the claims.152 The Eighth Circuit 
reversed and allowed Sprint to bring its claims in federal 
court.153 The Eighth Circuit, however, sidestepped the issue of 
§ 1738. Because the parties had not argued that there was any 
difference between common-law preclusion and § 1738, the court 
assumed the two were identical (even though implicit repeal uses 
a heightened standard).154 Because the Eighth Circuit’s prece-
dent in Iowa Network Services dictated that federal common law 
preclusion did not apply, the court found that § 1738 also did not 
apply.155 
 
 147 Communications Telesystems, 196 F3d at 1017–19. 
 148 Id at 1018 (“Section 1738 thus requires this court to accord the denial [of the writ 
of review by the California Supreme Court] the same res judicata effect.”). 
 149 See, for example, Coastal Communications Service, Inc v City of New York, 658 F 
Supp 2d 425, 439 (EDNY 2009); New Phone Co v New York City Department of Infor-
mation Technology and Telecommunications, 2006 WL 6908254, *17, 22 (EDNY); Verizon 
Maryland, 232 F Supp 2d at 549–50; Industrial Communications and Electronics, Inc v 
Monroe County, 2002 WL 34412977, *1–2 (SD Fla). 
 150 798 F3d 705 (8th Cir 2015). 
 151 Id at 706. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id at 708–09. 
 154 Sprint Communications, 798 F3d at 707: 
Federal courts must accord state-court decisions “full faith and credit” under 
28 U.S.C. § 1738, whereas the common law governs the preclusive effect of ad-
ministrative decisions. None of the defendants argued in their briefs that this 
distinction mattered, however. . . . We will thus assume—without deciding—
that the Iowa Network Services framework applies here.  
(citation omitted). 
 155 Id at 708. 
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In sum, aside from the Eighth Circuit’s avoidance of the issue 
in Sprint Communications, courts have applied § 1738 to state 
court judgments interpreting the 1996 Act. However, no court has 
been squarely presented with the issue of whether the Act implic-
itly repeals § 1738. Resolution of this issue is important because 
it can reshape both how the Act is interpreted and how it is ap-
plied, as well as help achieve the Act’s policy goals. 
III.  CONGRESS’S INTENT AND RES JUDICATA 
To understand Congress’s intent, both the plain language of 
the Act itself as well as the Act’s broader structure and purpose 
must be examined. The plain language alone does not speak to 
the issue of state adjudications binding federal courts. Contex-
tual analysis—specifically, examination of the Act’s goal of 
maintaining a uniform federal policy along with both its explicit 
restriction and preservation of state authority—reveals that the 
application of res judicata to state agency adjudications would 
undermine the goals of the Act and conflict with its explicit pro-
visions. Altogether, the Act’s purpose and structure demonstrate 
that Congress did not intend for federal courts to be bound by 
state agencies and that federal common law preclusion should 
not apply. 
This analysis of the Act forms the basis for determining 
whether § 1738 is implicitly repealed. Comparing state agency 
adjudications and state court judgments reveals that the two are 
identical in terms of their ultimate effect on the Act’s goals and 
function. Furthermore, application of res judicata to state court 
decisions would create an irreconcilable conflict with the Act, be-
cause federal review is necessary for the Act to achieve Con-
gress’s goals. In sum, this demonstrates that res judicata should 
not apply, for the same reasons that federal common law preclu-
sion should not apply. Binding federal courts to state court deci-
sions would undermine the Act’s purpose, allow for states to ex-
ceed the power left to them under the Act, and void the Act’s 
explicit preservation of autonomy for the individual states. In 
addition, comparison of the Act to the other statutes alleged to 
have implicitly repealed § 1738 reveals that the Act is most 
analogous to the only other statute found to have actually done 
so—the 1970 Amendments in Brown. Thus, although partial 
implied repeals are exceedingly rare, there is strong evidence 
that the Act implicitly repeals § 1738 and that federal courts are 
not bound by state court decisions involving the Act. 
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A. Federal Common Law Preclusion Should Not Apply to State 
Agency Adjudications of the 1996 Act 
As discussed in Part II.A, whether state agency adjudications 
are res judicata in federal court hinges on whether preclusion is 
consistent with Congress’s intent in passing the 1996 Act.156 To 
determine Congress’s intent, two primary factors must be evalu-
ated: (1) the plain language of the statute and (2) the broader 
structure and purpose of the Act.157   
The plain language of the Act does not expressly provide for 
federal review of state agency adjudications involving the Act. 
The Act does, however, explicitly restrict state agencies’ authori-
ty so that they may act only in accordance with federal policy.158 
The absence of any discussion of state adjudications may itself 
indicate that Congress intended res judicata to apply. However, 
the full context of the statute must also be examined before any 
conclusions may be drawn.159 
 
 156 See University of Tennessee v Elliott, 478 US 788, 794–96 (1986) (asserting that 
the question of preclusion depends on Congress’s intent). 
 157 See King v Burwell, 135 S Ct 2480, 2489 (2015) (noting that when interpreting 
statutes, the Court looks at the context in which the statute was adopted and at the 
“overall statutory scheme”); United States National Bank of Oregon v Independent In-
surance Agents of America, Inc, 508 US 439, 454–55 (1993) (“Statutory construction ‘is a 
holistic endeavor’ and, at a minimum, must account for a statute’s full text, language as 
well as punctuation, structure, and subject matter.”) (citation omitted). See also, for ex-
ample, Global NAPs, 427 F3d at 46–48 (examining the text of the Act, its purpose, and 
its structure to determine Congress’s intent); Iowa Network Services, 363 F3d at 690–94 
(determining Congress’s intent based on the text of the Act and its purpose). While this 
is the traditional method of statutory interpretation engaged in by the courts, it is 
worthwhile to note that this method is controversial among scholars. See, for example, 
Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Meth-
odology?, 96 Georgetown L J 1863, 1884–99 (2008) (describing the controversy surround-
ing statutory interpretation methods, and proposing a way to resolve issues and incon-
sistencies arising from the use of conflicting interpretive methods). 
 158 See, for example, 47 USC § 254(f):  
A State may adopt regulations not inconsistent with the Commission’s rules to 
preserve and advance universal service. . . . A State may adopt regulations to 
provide for additional definitions and standards to preserve and advance uni-
versal service within that State only to the extent that such regulations adopt 
additional specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms to support such def-
initions or standards that do not rely on or burden Federal universal service 
support mechanisms.  
 159 See King, 135 S Ct at 2489 (“So when deciding whether the language is plain, we 
must read the words in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statu-
tory scheme. Our duty, after all, is to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.”) (quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). See also Brown, 442 US at 135–38 (examining the pur-
pose of the 1970 Amendments to determine whether Congress intended res judicata to 
apply, even though the 1970 Amendments were silent on the issue). 
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Analysis of the structure and purpose of the Act demonstrates 
that allowing state agencies to have final, binding interpretations 
of the Act would conflict with Congress’s intent. First, the Act’s 
goals of creating a competitive market and expanding telecommu-
nications service require regulatory uniformity. Applying res 
judicata would undermine federal oversight and fracture this es-
sential uniformity, preventing the Act from serving its purpose. 
Second, the Act restricts and limits state authority. Res judicata 
would threaten these explicit provisions of the Act by allowing 
states to define the bounds of these limits without review. Final-
ly, the Act explicitly preserves each state’s authority over cer-
tain issues. The application of federal common law preclusion 
would enable one state agency’s adjudication to bind every other 
state on certain issues—contravening the congressional intent 
manifested in the Act. Taken together, the Act’s structure and 
purpose reveal that Congress did not intend for state agency ad-
judications to bind federal courts. 
1. The plain language of the Act is silent on federal review 
of state adjudications of the Act. 
The Act itself does not address whether state agency adjudi-
cations of the Act may be reviewed, but it does speak to the gen-
eral allocation of authority between the states and the federal 
government. As previously discussed in Part I.B, the many parts 
of the Act place explicit limitations on states that require them 
to act in accordance with federal policy.160 The Act explicitly dis-
cusses federal review only in § 252(e)(6), which provides that a 
party may challenge an interconnection agreement “in an ap-
propriate Federal district court to determine whether the 
agreement or statement meets the requirements of [the Act].”161 
Aside from this, the Act’s text does not address federal review of 
state adjudications. 
The lack of any discussion of this important issue in the Act 
may suggest that Congress intended res judicata to apply. After 
all, Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes”162 and is as-
sumed to legislate against a backdrop of common-law principles, 
including res judicata.163 The Supreme Court, however, has treat-
ed the absence of statutory language on federal review to be 
 
 160 See, for example, 47 USC §§ 251(d)(3), 252(e)(3), 253(a)–(b), 254(f). 
 161 47 USC § 252(e)(6). 
 162 Whitman v American Trucking Associations, Inc, 531 US 457, 468 (2001). 
 163 See Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association v Solimino, 501 US 104, 108 (1991). 
 918  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:893 
   
unimportant in previous decisions. For example, in Verizon Mary-
land Inc v Public Service Commission of Maryland,164 the Supreme 
Court interpreted the Act to grant federal courts general subject 
matter jurisdiction—despite the fact that § 252(e)(6) mentions 
federal review only in regard to interconnection agreements.165 
In addition, the Court found that “none of the other provisions of 
the Act evince any intent to preclude federal review of a [state] 
commission determination.”166 Granted, in Verizon Maryland 
there was a presumption that federal courts had subject matter 
jurisdiction, while in this context there is a presumption that res 
judicata applies. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and lower 
courts so far have all construed § 252(e)(6) very broadly to allow 
for federal review,167 which suggests that the Act’s silence on the 
issue should not be decisive.168 
Overall, the Act’s silence on res judicata and federal review 
is insufficient on its own to resolve whether Congress intended 
state adjudications to bar federal review. All that can be said 
based on the Act’s plain text is that Congress did not address 
the issue. Alone, this would be enough for the basic presumption 
of res judicata to apply. To conclusively decide the issue, howev-
er, the Act’s structure and purpose must also be examined to ful-
ly tease out what Congress intended the Act to accomplish, as 
well as how it was meant to work.169 
 
 164 535 US 635 (2002). 
 165 Id at 643. 
 166 Id at 644. 
 167 See Iowa Network Services, 363 F3d at 692–93 (holding that § 252(e)(6) allows 
for federal review of state agency determinations unrelated to interconnection agree-
ments); GTE North, Inc v Strand, 209 F3d 909, 915–19 (6th Cir 2000) (holding that 
§ 252(e)(6) does not limit federal review to only final interconnection agreements); 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co v Connect Communications Corp, 225 F3d 942, 945–48 
(8th Cir 2000) (interpreting § 252(e)(6) to allow for review of more than just whether an 
agreement meets the standards of §§ 251–52, despite the plain text of § 252(e)(6)); MCI 
Telecommunications Corp v Illinois Bell Telephone Co, 222 F3d 323, 337–38 (7th Cir 
2000) (holding that § 252(e)(6) allows federal courts to review more than a state’s ap-
proval or rejection of interconnection agreements); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co v 
Brooks Fiber Communications of Oklahoma, Inc, 235 F3d 493, 497 (10th Cir 2000) (in-
terpreting § 252(e)(6) broadly to allow federal courts to review subsequent interpreta-
tions of interconnection agreements after their approval).  
 168 See Iowa Network Services, 363 F3d at 690–94 (examining the structure and 
purpose of the Act to determine whether the presumption of res judicata applies, even 
though the Act’s text is silent on the issue). See also Brown, 442 US at 135–36, 138 (ana-
lyzing Congress’s intent in the 1970 Amendments to determine whether res judicata ap-
plied to state court judgments on certain issues when the 1970 Amendments did not ad-
dress res judicata). 
 169 See Food and Drug Administration v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 US 
120, 133 (2000) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a 
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2. The Act’s structure and purpose indicate that Congress 
did not intend for state agency adjudications to bind 
federal courts. 
While the Act’s plain text may not speak to whether there 
should be federal review of state agency adjudications regarding 
the Act, its structure and purpose indicate that there should 
be.170 If state agency interpretations of the Act became binding 
on federal courts, this would lead to a variety of results that 
Congress plainly did not intend when it passed the Act.171 Specif-
ically, res judicata would undermine the goals and effectiveness 
of the Act, contravene the Act’s explicit restrictions on state au-
thority, and threaten the limited authority preserved for the in-
dividual states. Because these results would conflict with Con-
gress’s intent, federal common law should not bar federal review 
of state agency adjudications concerning the Act.172 
a) Federal common law preclusion would undermine the 
uniform national policies necessary to accomplish the Act’s goals.  
Federal review of state agency interpretations is necessary to 
maintain the uniform federal policy implemented by the Act, and 
it is thus critical to the Act’s success.173 Regulatory parity across 
 
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statu-
tory scheme.”) (quotation marks omitted). See also Foley Bros, Inc v Filardo, 336 US 281, 
285–90 (1949) (considering a statute’s structure, purpose, legislative history, and admin-
istrative interpretations because the statute was silent on an issue). 
 170 See, for example, King, 135 S Ct at 2489–96 (relying on the purpose and struc-
ture of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to interpret its provisions because 
the plain text was ambiguous). 
 171 See, for example, id at 2492–93 (rejecting an interpretation of the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act that would “likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that Con-
gress designed the Act to avoid”). See also, for example, United States Telecom Associa-
tion v Federal Communications Commission, 359 F3d 554, 565–66 (DC Cir 2004) (stating 
that a federal agency may not delegate authority to state commissions, because doing so 
would work against the general aims of the authorizing statute). 
 172 For an analogous situation in which circuit courts have declined to apply common-
law preclusion based on strong federal interests in uniform regulation, see Arapahoe Coun-
ty Public Airport Authority v Federal Aviation Administration, 242 F3d 1213, 1220–21 
(10th Cir 2001) (declining to apply federal common law preclusion because it would re-
sult in “state courts trumping the federal interests” and “would further lead to incon-
sistent enforcement . . . potentially jeopardizing the efficiency and equality” in the na-
tional air transportation system); American Airlines, Inc v Department of 
Transportation, 202 F3d 788, 800–01 (5th Cir 2000) (holding that federal common law 
preclusion did not apply because “federal concerns [were] preeminent” and preclusion 
would “lead to inconsistent results”). 
 173 See Robinson and Nachbar, Communications Regulation at 556 (cited in note 16) 
(noting that, to achieve the Act’s goals, “it was considered necessary to develop a com-
prehensive federal scheme that in significant degree preempted state regulatory discre-
tion to the extent it might impede the overall congressional policy”). 
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states is necessary to both promote investment and “prevent[ ] 
burdensome and unnecessary state regulatory practices.”174 In-
consistent regulation results in a loss of product diversity, lower 
investment, and increased costs.175 By forcing carriers and busi-
nesses to work with fifty separate state regulators, uneven 
state-by-state regulation creates an uncertain and unstable 
marketplace that further discourages investment.176 It is also 
likely that state agencies, left without federal oversight, will im-
plement anticompetitive policies simply because they lack the 
appropriate national perspective and ability to address external-
ities and, as a result, are “doomed to reach incomplete and often 
inconsistent conclusions based on their own parochial inter-
ests.”177 Furthermore, even small deviations from federal policy 
can accumulate over time and cause real economic harm.178 This 
is why Congress intended the Act to create a national telecom-
munications policy featuring significant federal oversight and 
federal court involvement.179 
To understand the importance of consistent regulation, con-
sider a specific example. The FCC has recognized that inter-
carrier compensation leads to “inefficiencies and opportunities for 
wasteful arbitrage.”180 Allowing states to determine how much 
and when carriers must pay through state agency decisions 
shatters this uniformity and leads to greater arbitrage between 
 
 174 Cooper and Koukoutchos, 6 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 342–43 (cited in note 
63), citing In the Matter of Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communica-
tions Act, 9 FCC Rec 1411, 1421 (1994). 
 175 See Cooper and Koukoutchos, 6 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 352 (cited in note 
63) (outlining problems with state-by-state regulation). 
 176 Id at 352–53. 
 177 Id at 352–54. See also United States Telecom Association, 359 F3d at 565–66 (in-
validating the FCC’s delegation of authority to the states to regulate under § 251, be-
cause the states lacked the necessary “national vision and perspective”). 
 178 Cooper and Koukoutchos, 6 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 359 (cited in note 63). 
 179 See The Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act, 104th Cong, 1st 
Sess, in 141 Cong Rec 7882 (June 7, 1995) (statement of Senator Pressler); HR Rep No 
104-204(I) at 94 (cited in note 66):  
The Committee finds that current State and local requirements . . . have created 
an inconsistent and, at times, conflicting patchwork of requirements which will 
inhibit the deployment of [advanced services]. . . . The Committee believes it is in 
the national interest that uniform, consistent requirements, with adequate safe-
guards of the public health and safety, be established as soon as possible. 
See also United States Telecom Association, 359 F3d at 565–66 (striking down an FCC 
delegation of authority to state commissions because it violated Congress’s intent and 
threatened to undermine regulatory uniformity). 
 180 In the Matter of Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rec 17663, 17669 ¶ 9 (2011).  
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states and carriers, undermining federal reform.181 At the same 
time, this also creates inefficient distortions by increasing carri-
ers’ costs, which are then passed on to consumers and frustrate 
Congress’s goal of universal service.182 If states were allowed to 
interpret when carriers must pay each other without federal re-
view—for example, as the district courts held in Sprint Commu-
nications Co v Bernsten183 and Ohio Bell Telephone Co v Public 
Utilities Commission of Ohio184—it would undermine the uni-
form federal intercarrier-compensation regime installed by 
the Act. 
Moreover, as the FCC has noted, the Act’s goals to promote 
competition, reform intercarrier compensation, and revise uni-
versal service are all “integrally related.”185 If the Act fails to 
achieve one of its goals, then it cannot fully accomplish its other 
objectives.186 If states are able to individually interpret the Act, 
such a system seems destined to result in the same uneven im-
plementation and administration that the Act was meant to 
fix.187 This is why Congress explicitly limited the authority of the 
states so that they can act only in accordance with federal poli-
cy,188 and it is why state regulation “must be carefully policed . . . 
by federal courts.”189 Accordingly, Congress did not intend that 
federal common law should prevent federal courts from resolv-
ing issues related to the Act. 
This interpretation is consistent with the courts’ construc-
tion of the Act. The courts have interpreted the Act as having 
 
 181 See Global NAPs, 427 F3d at 47–48 (holding that the application of issue preclu-
sion could “threaten the authority allocated to the FCC” and “set up an opportunity for 
regulatory arbitrage contrary to the purposes of the [Act]”). 
 182 See S Rep No 104-23 at 5 (cited in note 32) (describing the Act’s goal “to achieve 
greater consistency between Federal and State actions to protect universal service”). 
 183 Order, Civil Action No 11-183, *7, 12 (SD Iowa filed Aug 5, 2014). 
 184 844 F Supp 2d 873, 880–84 (SD Ohio 2012). 
 185 In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rec 15499, 15505–07 ¶¶ 3–7 (1996) (acknowledging 
the “trilogy” of reforms implemented by the Act and explaining how each is necessary to 
accomplish the Act’s goals). 
 186 See id at 15507–08 ¶¶ 4, 9 (“Only when all parts of the trilogy are complete will the 
task of adjusting the regulatory framework to fully competitive markets be finished.”). 
 187 See id at 15527–32 ¶¶ 54–62 (finding that implementing uniform national rules 
for certain issues was consistent with Congress’s intent and the goals of the Act). 
 188 See, for example, 47 USC §§ 251(d)(3), 252(e)(3), 253(a)–(b), 254(f). See also 
Cooper and Koukoutchos, 6 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 346 (cited in note 63) (“Con-
gress federalized this area of the law for the same reasons it federalized regulation of the 
wireless industry: because it was inherently a national network industry, and because 
the states were imposing rate regulation that was unwise and counterproductive.”). 
 189 Cooper and Koukoutchos, 6 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 359 (cited in note 63). 
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“offered the states . . . a role as . . . a ‘deputized’ federal regula-
tor. In exchange for this grant of regulatory power, Congress [ ] 
required the states to agree to submit to federal jurisdiction to 
review their actions.”190 Furthermore, the courts have acknowl-
edged that Congress was well aware of the original jurisdictional 
split that existed prior to the Act—in which states controlled in-
trastate regulation while the FCC handled interstate regula-
tion—and that Congress granted “[f]ederal courts . . . the ulti-
mate power to interpret provisions of the 1996 Act.”191 As the 
Supreme Court held in AT&T Corp, the Act ended the debate 
about “whether the States will be allowed to do their own 
thing.”192 Allowing states to act independently without review 
threatens to create regulatory inconsistency contrary to Con-
gress’s intent and the Act.193 Therefore, “if the federal courts be-
lieve a state commission is not regulating in accordance with 
federal policy they may bring it to heel.”194 The courts’ interpre-
tation of the Act thereby supports the idea that Congress did not 
intend res judicata to bar federal courts from reviewing state 
agency interpretations of the Act, because such a result would 
directly undermine the effectiveness of the Act. 
b) Applying federal common law preclusion to state agen-
cy adjudications would conflict with the Act’s explicit restrictions 
on state authority.  Throughout the Act, Congress placed explicit 
limits on state authority so that states cannot act in a manner 
that contravenes federal telecommunications policy.195 These 
 
 190 MCI Telecommunications, 222 F3d at 343–44 (“Congress . . . has precluded all oth-
er regulation except on its terms. . . . [T]he states are not merely acting in an area regulat-
ed by Congress; they are now voluntarily regulating on behalf of Congress.”) (emphasis in 
original). See also AT&T Communications v BellSouth Telecommunications Inc, 238 F3d 
636, 646–47 (5th Cir 2001) (“Congress established a federal system headed by the FCC to 
regulate local telecommunications competition. The Act permissibly offers state regulatory 
agencies a limited mission . . . to apply federal law and regulations as arbitrators and ancil-
lary regulators within the federal system and on behalf of Congress.”). 
 191 Iowa Network Services, 363 F3d at 692. 
 192 AT&T Corp, 525 US at 378 n 6. 
 193 See United States Telecom Association, 359 F3d at 565–66 (observing that giving 
state regulators authority over federal telecommunications policy created the risk that 
states would “pursue goals inconsistent with those of the [FCC] and the underlying stat-
utory scheme . . . aggravat[ing] the risk of policy drift inherent in any principal-agent 
relationship”). 
 194 AT&T Corp, 525 US at 378 n 6. 
 195 See, for example, 47 USC §§ 251(d)(3), 252(e)(3), 253(a)–(b), 254(f) (detailing the 
limits on the ability of states in the telecommunications sphere). See also MCI Telecom-
munications, 222 F3d at 343–44; In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competi-
tion Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rec at 15531–32 ¶ 62 
(finding that requiring state conformity with national rules was a “highly desirable” 
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checks are necessary because elected state agency officials often 
have divergent incentives to appease voters in their respective 
states,196 have a basic desire to preserve and enhance their own 
authority,197 and lack the “national vision and perspective” nec-
essary to effectively implement federal telecommunications poli-
cy.198 Allowing states to create unreviewable interpretations of 
the Act through adjudication would, in practice, remove these 
explicit restrictions on state authority. 
This is best understood by examining the relationship be-
tween the deference given to state agency rulemakings and state 
agency adjudications. State agency rulemakings that interpret 
federal telecommunications law are reviewed de novo, without 
any deference accorded to the state agency.199 If state adjudica-
tions that interpret federal law are not given preclusive effect, 
then they are reviewed under the same nondeferential stand-
ard.200 This makes sense because agency interpretations of stat-
utes are accorded deference only if that agency is delegated au-
thority under the statute.201 Because the Act is a federal law and 
 
means of achieving “Congress’s goal of a pro-competitive national policy framework”). 
For a more detailed discussion, see Part I.B. 
 196 See Cooper and Koukoutchos, 6 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 355–59 (cited in 
note 63) (describing how state regulators have resisted and tried to work around federal 
limitations on their authority); Michael K. Kellogg, John Thorne, and Peter W. Huber, 
Federal Telecommunications Law § 1.10 at 68–69 (Little, Brown 1992) (describing state 
regulatory commissioners who resisted the move to usage-based pricing). 
 197 See William A. Niskanen Jr, Bureaucracy and Public Economics 36–42 (Edward 
Elgar 1994) (describing agencies’ incentives to expand their own power and to be budget 
maximizers). 
 198 United States Telecom Association, 359 F3d at 565–66 (striking down the FCC’s 
delegation of authority to state agencies to make § 251(d)(2) “impairment” determina-
tions, because such delegation risked allowing the states to “pursue goals inconsistent 
with . . . the underlying statutory scheme [of the Act]”). See also Cooper and Koukoutchos, 
6 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 352–55 (cited in note 63) (describing how allowing indi-
vidual state agencies to regulate telecommunications is “fundamentally incompatible 
with modern wireline telephony” due to their inability to properly perceive and deal with 
externalities inherent in telecommunications regulation). 
 199 See Puerto Rico Telephone Co v SprintCom, Inc, 662 F3d 74, 89 (1st Cir 2011) 
(“[W]e review de novo the Board’s interpretations of federal and state law.”); WWC Li-
cense, LLC v Boyle, 459 F3d 880, 889–90 (8th Cir 2006) (“We owe no deference to the 
[state] Commission’s interpretations of federal law.”). 
 200 See Iowa Network Services, Inc v Qwest Corp, 385 F Supp 2d 850, 864 (SD Iowa 
2005) (reviewing de novo a state agency’s interpretation of federal law in an adjudication). 
 201 See United States v Mead Corp, 533 US 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding that Chevron 
deference is applicable only if “Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to 
make rules carrying the force of law, and [if] the agency interpretation claiming defer-
ence was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”). Furthermore, state agency in-
terpretations are also likely not entitled to lesser Skidmore deference. See Kristin E. 
Hickman and Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 
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is implemented by the FCC, there is no basis for courts to defer 
to state agency interpretations of it.202 
The application of res judicata, however, flips the standard 
of review on its head. Instead of being given no deference, inter-
pretations of federal law that occur as part of state agency adju-
dications become completely unreviewable in federal court. The 
application of federal common law preclusion would thereby al-
low states to go from receiving no deference when interpreting 
the Act to having full and binding authority to do so.203 This re-
sult violates the Act’s explicit limitations on state authority by 
allowing state agencies to interpret those limitations and other 
components of federal law without review. Altogether, giving 
state agencies complete deference in their interpretations of fed-
eral law has no basis in the law and violates the Act. 
Further, if state adjudications were res judicata, then FCC 
rulemaking or adjudication would be the only way that such in-
terpretations—from either state agencies or state courts—could 
be reviewed or changed. This form of delayed review,204 however, 
is inconsistent with Congress’s intent to “accelerate rapidly pri-
vate sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and in-
formation technologies and services.”205 It also remains to be seen 
whether the FCC has the organizational resources to assume the 
 
Colum L Rev 1235, 1263 (2007) (“Separately, while Skidmore’s attention to agency ex-
pertise might suggest that it should apply to state agencies, the Court has never sug-
gested that Skidmore extends that far.”) (citation omitted). 
 202 See Puerto Rico Telephone Co, 662 F3d at 89: 
[A]lthough it is customary where any doubt exists to give some deference to the 
agency charged with administering a statute, we give no deference to the 
Board’s interpretation of the 1996 Act because it is the FCC—and not the indi-
vidual state commissions—that has the authority to administer the 1996 Act.  
(citation omitted). 
 203 See GTE North, 209 F3d at 915 (holding that barring federal review of state ac-
tions “would frustrate Congress’s intent by allowing state commissions to insulate from 
federal review decisions allegedly preempted by, or otherwise contrary to, federal tele-
communications law”). 
 204 See J. Brad Bernthal, Procedural Architecture Matters: Innovation Policy at the 
Federal Communications Commission, 1 Tex A&M L Rev 615, 642–45 (2014) (describing 
why FCC proceedings are structured to favor the status quo and encourage delay, and 
referencing one rulemaking process that took nearly ten years to complete). From 2010 
to 2015, the median time from filing to disposition of a civil case in federal district court 
varied between 6.8 and 8.8 months. United States District Courts — National Judicial 
Caseload Profile *1, archived at http://perma.cc/4E3F-AH3H. Over the same 6 years, the 
median time from filing a notice of appeal to disposition of a case in federal circuit court 
varied between 8.4 and 11.8 months. U.S. Court of Appeals - Judicial Caseload Profile 
*2, archived at http://perma.cc/F7YN-4PD9. 
 205 S Rep No 104-230 at 1 (cited in note 36).  
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task of managing and reviewing state agency adjudications in 
such detail. This is an issue that the 1996 Act certainly does not 
address, as it does not provide increased resources, guidance, or 
personnel for the FCC to oversee the individual states in such 
minutiae.206 Finally, even if FCC review were meant to be the 
only federal review mechanism, the FCC’s interpretations would 
still ultimately be reviewed by the federal courts. After all, FCC 
actions are ultimately subject to review in federal court—though 
the FCC receives much greater deference than state agencies.207 
Thus, applying res judicata to state agency adjudications would, 
at the very least, undermine—if not outright void—the explicit 
restrictions that Congress placed on state authority to regulate 
telecommunications services. 
c) Applying federal common law preclusion to state agen-
cy adjudications would conflict with the Act’s explicit preserva-
tion of state authority over certain issues.  In addition to allowing 
the states to upset the Act’s limits on state authority, the appli-
cation of res judicata would contravene Congress’s intent to pre-
serve the states’ authority within their own territories.208 Within 
the Act itself, there are numerous carveouts for states to exer-
cise their own authority so long as it is in conformity with the 
Act.209 However, if state agency adjudications are given res judi-
cata effect, then one state can be bound by another state’s inter-
pretation of the Act.210 Such a result voids Congress’s explicit re-
tention of states’ authority over certain issues. 
Preclusion could manifest itself as either claim preclusion or 
issue preclusion in this context. For example, suppose that Carri-
er A uses verbatim language in its interconnection agreements in 
both Kansas and Missouri. Carrier A has a dispute with Carrier 
B in Kansas over the meaning of some of the language in their in-
terconnection agreement, specifically about what kind of access 
 
 206 Bernthal, 1 Tex A&M L Rev at 625 (cited in note 204) (observing that the FCC 
“lacks sufficient resources . . . to perform its core functions”). 
 207 See, for example, City of Arlington, Texas v Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 133 S Ct 1863, 1869–73 (2013) (describing Chevron deference and upholding FCC 
regulations regarding applications for wireless facility sitings that were issued pursuant 
to the Act). 
 208 See 141 Cong Rec at 7886–88 (cited in note 179) (discussing the role envisioned 
for the states to retain individual authority over issues regarding interconnection, retail 
services, and universal service, so long as the states’ regulations in those areas are con-
sistent with the FCC’s regulations). 
 209 See Part I.B (discussing how the Act explicitly preserved authority for the states 
over certain issues). 
 210 See Global NAPs, 427 F3d at 47–49. 
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Carrier A must give Carrier B to its network elements in the 
state. The two parties then decide to adjudicate their dispute in 
front of the Kansas Corporation Commission. The Kansas Cor-
poration Commission adjudicates the issue and rules in favor of 
Carrier B. Applying preclusive effect to the Kansas Corporation 
Commission’s decision would have two consequences. First, if 
Carrier A tried to adjudicate the issue again in Missouri, the 
Missouri Public Service Commission would be compelled to fol-
low the Kansas Corporation Commission’s legal interpretation of 
the agreement and rule in favor of Carrier B. Second, if the 
same language from Carrier A’s interconnection agreement were 
also used by Carrier C in Missouri, then the Missouri Public 
Service Commission would again be bound to the same interpre-
tation used by the Kansas Corporation Commission. 
Application of federal common law preclusion to one state 
agency’s adjudication would thereby allow it to bind every other 
state on a given issue, because the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
of the US Constitution requires each state to give preclusive ef-
fect to other states’ administrative adjudications.211 This con-
flicts with Congress’s intent to allow each individual state to re-
tain some authority over telecommunications regulation—
evident from the fact that the Act repeatedly refers to a state’s 
authority to enforce its own laws and regulations.212 The only 
way to avoid this result is for federal courts to not apply federal 
common law preclusion. 
The First Circuit concluded in Global NAPs that federal 
common law preclusion would conflict with Congress’s intent for 
precisely this reason.213 In Global NAPs, the issue was whether 
an adjudication by the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission 
 
 211 US Const Art IV, § 1 (requiring the states to give “Full Faith and Credit” to the 
judgments of other states). Courts are unanimous in holding that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause requires states to accord other states’ administrative fact-findings res ju-
dicata effect. See Elliott, 478 US at 798, citing Thomas v Washington Gas Light Co, 448 
US 261, 281 (1980) (noting that “the Full Faith and Credit Clause compels the States to 
give preclusive effect to the factfindings of an administrative tribunal in a sister State”). 
The circuits are currently split on whether states are bound by other state agencies’ 
conclusions of law. Compare Miller v County of Santa Cruz, 39 F3d 1030, 1037–38 (9th 
Cir 1994) (holding that a state agency’s interpretation of law binds other states), with 
Edmundson v Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F3d 186, 193 (3d Cir 1993) (holding that a 
state agency’s interpretation of law did not bind other states).  
 212 See, for example, 47 USC §§ 252(e)(3), 253(b), 254(f). See also S Rep No 104-23 at 
35 (cited in note 32) (referring to the Act’s goal of preserving “a State’s authority” to im-
plement consumer-protection regulations if consistent with the Act). 
 213 Global NAPs, 427 F3d at 47–49. 
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over an interconnection agreement bound the Massachusetts 
Department of Telecommunications and Energy when it was in-
terpreting verbatim language in a different agreement.214 The 
district court held that federal common law preclusion applied 
and that Massachusetts was therefore bound by the previous 
Rhode Island adjudication.215 The First Circuit reversed because 
applying res judicata to state agency adjudications—and thereby 
binding one state to follow another state’s decisions—conflicted 
with the Act’s “intended effect of leaving state commissions free, 
where warranted, to reflect the policy choices made by their 
states.”216 The court also noted that the application of res judica-
ta would create perverse incentives, as carriers would be incen-
tivized to rush to obtain decisions from the state agencies that 
are most favorable to them in order to preclude other states from 
ruling differently.217 Such “results cut directly against Congress’s 
desire, as evinced by the text and structure of the [Act].”218 When 
it preserved authority for the states, Congress surely did not in-
tend that one state be able to bind every other state with its de-
cisions219—an absurd result that must be avoided when inter-
preting the Act.220 Therefore, federal common law preclusion 
should not apply to state agency adjudications of federal law is-
sues under the Act. 
 
 214 Id at 35. 
 215 Global NAPs, Inc v Verizon New England Inc, 332 F Supp 2d 341, 365–70 (D 
Mass 2004), revd, 427 F3d 34 (1st Cir 2005), citing Elliott, 478 US at 798–99 (“Thus, this 
court holds that all of the decisions of the [Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission]—
both factual and legal—are entitled to the same preclusive effect before other agencies 
and courts that they would receive in the Rhode Island state courts.”). 
 216 Global NAPs, 427 F3d at 46, citing Peter W. Huber, Michael K. Kellogg, and 
John Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law §§ 3.3.3 to .4 (Aspen 2d ed 1999).  
 217 Global NAPs, 427 F3d at 48 (noting that providing preclusive effect “creates the 
risk of perverse incentives” because “state commissions themselves would be encouraged 
to decide an issue as quickly as possible, to preserve their independence” and “[c]arriers 
. . . will race to the state commission with the most amenable views, and perhaps lever-
age that decision to their advantage”). 
 218 Id.  
 219 It is important to note, however, that in some instances it is federal policy for one 
state agency’s findings to bind other states in order to achieve uniformity. This is not the 
operation of res judicata but instead of FCC regulations that the Act mandates the states 
to follow. For example, once one state agency has determined that it is technically possi-
ble to unbundle certain network elements, all other states’ agencies are required to pre-
sume that this unbundling is possible in their states as well, absent a specific showing by 
a carrier to rebut this presumption. See id at 48–49, citing 47 CFR §§ 51.230(c), 
51.319(b)(3)(iii). 
 220 See Griffin v Oceanic Contractors, Inc, 458 US 564, 575 (1982) (“[I]nterpretations 
of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpre-
tations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”). 
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3. An objection: why not exclusive federal jurisdiction? 
If res judicata does not apply and all state agency adjudica-
tions may be retried at the federal level, it may seem strange 
that Congress allowed states to hear claims involving the 1996 
Act at all. If Congress intended not to allow federal courts to 
have the final say on such issues, it could be argued that Con-
gress would have simply given federal courts exclusive jurisdic-
tion. This would seem to be a logical choice if Congress intended 
federal courts to be the final arbiters of the Act, because it would 
prevent forum shopping and relitigation. Furthermore, Congress 
clearly knew how to do this, because it granted federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction in § 252(e)(6) to review state agency de-
terminations relating to interconnection agreements. It makes 
sense for a variety of reasons, however, for states to retain juris-
diction over federal claims in suits that also involve state tele-
communications regulation. 
First, the Act made states “deputized” regulators who en-
force federal telecommunications law.221 As enforcers of the fed-
eral regime, states necessarily must be able to adjudicate claims 
that involve basic implementation of the Act—otherwise, their 
enforcement efforts would be ultimately toothless. In addition, 
state enforcement actions that apply well-settled or clear federal 
law will not require federal review, even though it is available. 
Therefore, state jurisdiction allows states to fulfill their role as 
deputized regulators of federal policy. Even though federal review 
would be available for any application of federal law, sophisticat-
ed parties likely would not bother to challenge such application in 
federal court if the state’s application of federal law were clearly 
correct. This reduces any potential relitigation. 
Second, removing state jurisdiction would unnecessarily 
complicate the enforcement of purely state regulation. Under the 
Act, states still retain authority to implement their own tele-
communications regulations so long as they do not conflict with 
federal law. Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to 
 
 221 MCI Telecommunications, 222 F3d at 344 (finding that “Congress has offered the 
states . . . [a] grant of regulatory power [under the Act]” in exchange for “agree[ing] to 
submit to federal jurisdiction to review their actions”). See also AT&T Communications, 
238 F3d at 646–47 (“The Act permissibly offers state regulatory agencies a limited mis-
sion . . . to apply federal law and regulations as arbitrators and ancillary regulators 
within the federal system and on behalf of Congress.”). 
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hear purely state law claims related to such regulation.222 Fur-
ther complicating the issue is the fact that litigation of state 
claims may result in a decision—through an interpretation of ei-
ther a state law or contract language—that contravenes federal 
law. In this way, delineating between state and federal law is-
sues in the telecommunications context can be difficult. If Con-
gress were to have stripped states of jurisdiction over federal 
claims, it would likely interfere with the states’ resolution of 
purely state issues. 
Finally, allowing states to interpret and apply their own 
laws in adjudications can avoid the need for federal review. 
State adjudications may interpret state laws in such a way that 
avoids any need to interpret federal law. In fact, states may seek 
to construe state laws in light of federal law to deliberately avoid 
conflict.223 This allows states to maintain full control over certain 
areas of regulation as the Act intended. Ultimately, the Act’s re-
tention of state jurisdiction alone is not enough to show that 
Congress intended for res judicata to apply. 
B. The 1996 Act Implicitly Repeals § 1738 
Congress’s intent, evinced by the 1996 Act’s goals and struc-
ture, also demonstrates that the Act implicitly repeals § 1738. 
The conflict between the Act and § 1738 meets the higher “irrec-
oncilable” standard for implicit repeal because repeal is “implied 
only if necessary to make the [later enacted law] work.”224 Be-
cause res judicata frustrates the Act’s goals, as well as the ex-
press limitation and preservation of state authority, implicit re-
peal of § 1738 is necessary for the Act to work. In addition, the 
philosophy and scheme behind the Act are analogous to the 1970 
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, which the Supreme Court 
held in Brown to implicitly repeal § 1738.225 Finally, the policy 
rationale behind § 1738—and res judicata generally—is weak in 
 
 222 See, for example, Puerto Rico Telephone Co v Telecommunications Regulatory 
Board of Puerto Rico, 189 F3d 1, 19 (1st Cir 1999) (holding that federal courts lack juris-
diction to hear purely state law claims).  
 223 See, for example, In re Bretton Woods Telephone Co, 56 A3d 1266, 1275 (NH 
2012) (striking down a New Hampshire state law that violated the Act, but noting that 
the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission could potentially craft regulations that 
complied with federal law). 
 224 Radzanower v Touche Ross & Co, 426 US 148, 155 (1976), quoting Silver v New 
York Stock Exchange, 373 US 341, 357 (1963) (brackets in original). 
 225 Brown, 442 US at 135–36. 
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the context of the Act and is outweighed by the benefits of feder-
al review. 
1. The Act’s structure and purpose indicate that Congress 
did not intend for state courts to bind federal courts. 
While the Act’s text does not speak to how federal courts 
should treat state court judgments,226 careful analysis reveals 
that the Act’s objectives are hindered by the application of res 
judicata to state court decisions in just the same manner as by 
the application of res judicata to state agency adjudications. The 
Act’s explicit limitation and preservation of state authority are 
likewise jeopardized by applying res judicata to state court 
judgments. Accordingly, it would conflict with Congress’s intent 
to apply § 1738, and the statutory provision is thereby implicitly 
repealed.  
In terms of the impact on federal telecommunications policy 
and the goals of the Act, a state court judgment is effectively 
identical to a state agency adjudication. Both are decisions re-
garding state telecommunications regulations and their interac-
tion with federal law. In fact, most state court decisions that in-
volve telecommunications regulations are simply reviewed 
agency decisions.227 Further, some state courts even give defer-
ence to state agency interpretations of the Act.228 The only actual 
difference between the two is that state agency adjudications can 
involve a state agency’s review of its own actions or policies. A 
state court decision, meanwhile, implicates review of either a state 
agency’s decision or some other party’s action. But both state 
agency adjudications and state court decisions have the same re-
sult: a binding interpretation of federal law. Thus, the source of 
the action—whether it is a state agency, a state legislative body, 
 
 226 For analysis of the Act’s text, see Part III.A.1. 
 227 See, for example, Sprint Communications, 798 F3d at 706–07; Communications 
Telesystems, 196 F3d at 1014–15. 
 228 Compare MCI WorldCom Communications, Inc v Department of Telecommunica-
tions and Energy, 810 NE2d 802, 809 (Mass 2004) (holding that the Massachusetts De-
partment of Telecommunications and Energy’s interpretation of an interconnection 
agreement’s requirements under § 252(e)(6) was owed “great deference” by state courts), 
with Bretton Woods, 56 A3d at 1273 (reviewing de novo a state agency’s interpretation of 
§ 253 of the Act). Deference to state agency interpretations of federal statutes, however, 
is inappropriate. See Michigan Bell Telephone Co v Strand, 305 F3d 580, 586 (6th Cir 
2002), quoting Orthopaedic Hospital v Belshe, 103 F3d 1491, 1495 (9th Cir 1997) (“[A] 
state agency’s interpretation of federal statutes is not entitled to the deference afforded a 
federal agency’s interpretation of its own statutes under Chevron.”) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
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or some other source—creates a distinction between state agen-
cy adjudications and state court judgments that has no differ-
ence in terms of the action’s ultimate effect on federal telecom-
munications policy.229 Accordingly, a federal court’s review of a 
state court decision is equivalent to federal review of a state 
agency adjudication in terms of its impact. Giving a reviewed 
state agency decision greater preclusive effect would serve no 
purpose but to make otherwise-reviewable state agency deci-
sions unreviewable, frustrating Congress’s intent.230 
State court judgments therefore have the same potential to 
undermine the Act as state agency adjudications have. For exam-
ple, applying res judicata to a state court judgment that deter-
mines whether a state agency has the authority to classify a given 
service as an “information service” or a “telecommunication ser-
vice” under the Act231 stands to potentially increase or decrease 
the state’s authority beyond the Act’s prescribed limits. Fur-
thermore, if such a decision is not in line with federal policy, 
then it stands to undermine the goals and purpose of the Act by 
overregulating those services (thus harming competition) and by 
increasing carriers’ costs (thus undermining universal service 
and intercarrier-compensation reforms). Similarly, a grant of 
preclusive effect to such a determination could also be used to 
bind other states, violating the Act’s explicit preservation of 
their authority. Thus, for the same reasons discussed in Part 
III.A.2, granting res judicata effect to state court decisions un-
dermines the purpose of the Act and contravenes the Act’s ex-
plicit limitations on state authority, as well as its explicit 
preservation of such authority. 
2. The conflict between the Act and § 1738 is irreconcilable 
and clearly manifests Congress’s intent to implicitly 
repeal § 1738. 
Simply being contrary to Congress’s intent may be sufficient 
to overcome federal common law preclusion, but § 1738 requires 
 
 229 See GTE North, 209 F3d at 918–19 (describing the “enormous negative implica-
tions” of not allowing federal review of state actions). 
 230 See id at 915–16 (holding that the denial of federal review would “frustrate Con-
gress’s intent by allowing state commissions to insulate from federal review decisions 
allegedly preempted by, or otherwise contrary to, federal telecommunications law”). 
 231 This was essentially the issue disputed in Sprint Communications that had been 
previously decided by the Iowa Utilities Board and reviewed by a state court. Sprint 
Communications, 798 F3d at 706–07. 
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that Congress “clearly manifest” its intent.232 Accordingly, the 
Act and § 1738 must be irreconcilable233—a standard that the 
Supreme Court has rarely found satisfied.234 The application of 
§ 1738, however, would create irreconcilable conflict with the 
explicit provisions of the Act in the manner and ways previously 
discussed. Application of res judicata in one state court neces-
sarily binds other states, shattering the cooperative federalism 
explicitly laid out in the Act.235 As a result, implicit repeal of 
§ 1738 is required because otherwise the Act would not 
“work.”236 
The Supreme Court’s previous treatment of the Act corrobo-
rates this. In AT&T Corp, the Court addressed whether the Act 
was a “‘clear and manifest’ showing of congressional intent to 
supplant traditional state police powers” over telecommunica-
tions regulation.237 The Court held that the Act “unquestionably” 
was.238 In addition, the Court noted that “a federal program ad-
ministered by 50 independent state agencies is surpassing 
strange” and that “if the federal courts believe a state commis-
sion is not regulating in accordance with federal policy they may 
bring it to heel.”239 Since state court decisions may be properly 
characterized in the context of telecommunications regulation as 
being functionally the same as state agency adjudications, the 
Court’s strong language is equally applicable to § 1738. This con-
firms that § 1738 creates an irreconcilable conflict with the Act 
and is therefore implicitly repealed. 
 
 232 Kremer v Chemical Construction Corp, 456 US 461, 477 (1982). 
 233 Id at 468, citing Radzanower, 426 US at 154.  
 234 See Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co v Epstein, 516 US 367, 380–81 (1996).  
 235 Global NAPs, 427 F3d at 47–48 (explaining that “[f]or a court to step in and shift 
the state-by-state decision-making authority” from one state to another, as the result of 
giving one state’s adjudications preclusive effect over the other’s, “would upset the allo-
cations of authority made out under the [Act]” and undermine the “scheme of cooperative 
federalism” embodied in the Act).  
 236 Radzanower, 426 US at 155, quoting Silver, 373 US at 357 (holding that there is 
implicit repeal when it is “necessary to make the [later enacted law] work”) (brackets in 
original). 
 237 AT&T Corp, 525 US at 378 n 6, quoting Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 US 
218, 230 (1947). 
 238 AT&T Corp, 525 US at 378 n 6. 
 239 Id.  
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3. The Act is analogous to the 1970 Amendments held by 
the Supreme Court to implicitly repeal § 1738. 
Although the Supreme Court has found § 1738 to be implic-
itly repealed only once, that single instance is more analogous to 
the 1996 Act than are the instances in which the Court has held 
otherwise.240 Specifically, in Brown, the Court held that the 1970 
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act implicitly repealed 
§ 1738.241 Prior to the 1970 Amendments, certain bankruptcy 
dischargeability issues were typically decided in state courts 
when judgment-enforcement actions were brought under state 
law.242 The 1970 Amendments changed the dischargeability 
rules and required creditors to apply to federal bankruptcy 
courts to adjudicate those questions.243 At issue in the case was 
whether a state court judgment that had decided facts underly-
ing the dischargeability question was reviewable by the federal 
bankruptcy court.244 Although Congress’s intent was not explicit 
in either the 1970 Amendments themselves or the legislative his-
tory, the Court held that “it would be inconsistent with the phi-
losophy of the 1970 amendments to adopt a policy of res judicata” 
that allowed state courts “to resolve a federal dischargeability 
question.”245 In reaching this conclusion, the Court highlighted 
the fact that the 1970 Amendments gave exclusive jurisdiction 
to federal bankruptcy courts and that Congress preferred such 
claims to be resolved by federal courts with greater expertise.246 
 
 240 The previous instances when the Court has found § 1738 not to be implicitly re-
pealed are all distinguishable from the Act because each of those cases involved statutes 
that created private rights of action or that limited when courts can enter certain injunc-
tions, not statutes that created national regulatory regimes. See Allen v McCurry, 449 
US 90, 104–05 (1980) (holding that § 1983 does not implicitly repeal § 1738); Kremer, 456 
US at 476–78 (holding that Title VII does not implicitly repeal § 1738); Matsushita, 516 
US at 386 (holding that the Securities Exchange Act does not implicitly repeal § 1738); 
Parsons Steel, Inc v First Alabama Bank, 474 US 518, 523–24 (1986) (limiting when 
courts can enter injunctions under the Anti-Injunction Act).  
 241 Brown, 442 US at 138–39 (noting that allowing a state court decision to be res 
judicata would take certain federal bankruptcy issues “out of bankruptcy courts well 
suited to adjudicate them, and force those issues onto state courts concerned with other 
matters, all for the sake of a repose the bankrupt has long since abandoned”). 
 242 See id at 129 (stating that “[t]raditionally, the bankruptcy court . . . left [ ] dis-
chargeability . . . to the court in which the creditor sued, after bankruptcy, to enforce his 
prior judgment”). 
 243 Id at 129–30 (“In 1970, however, Congress altered [federal bankruptcy law] to re-
quire creditors to apply to the bankruptcy court for adjudication of certain dischargeability 
questions.”). 
 244 Id at 128–31. 
 245 Brown, 442 US at 136–37.  
 246 Id at 135–37. 
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Although the Court never explicitly mentioned § 1738, the Court 
held that the state court judgment was not res judicata in feder-
al court.247 The Court and scholars have since acknowledged that 
the Court’s decision was equivalent to a holding that § 1738 was 
implicitly repealed.248 
The philosophy behind the 1996 Act is parallel to that en-
compassed in the 1970 Amendments at issue in Brown. Both 
embody a shift away from state resolution of certain issues. In 
the 1970 Amendments, Congress intended there to be a strong 
federal bankruptcy scheme that resolved certain bankruptcy is-
sues—taking the authority to resolve those issues away from the 
states. In the 1996 Act, Congress intended there to be a uniform 
federal telecommunications regime249—again, taking authority 
away from the states. 
There is, however, a noticeable difference between the two. 
The 1970 Amendments dealt much more directly with federal 
review because bankruptcies by nature involve the judicial sys-
tem. The 1996 Act, however, goes to great lengths to detail fed-
eral primacy over the states when it comes to telecommunica-
tions regulation. Necessarily behind this federal regime is 
judicial enforcement to ensure that the states act in line with 
federal policy. State courts lack the national perspective—
analogous to their lack of expertise in Brown250—that is required 
to properly interpret the 1996 Act, so federal court oversight is 
essential.251 Although it may be one step further from the Act it-
self, the necessity of federal review—and repeal of § 1738—is 
parallel to the philosophy behind the 1970 Amendments. The 
Court’s holding in Brown thereby suggests that the Act implicit-
ly repeals § 1738. 
In addition, it is worthwhile to note that the Act is distin-
guishable from every instance in which the Court has not found 
implicit repeal. None of the statutes considered by the Court 
 
 247 Id at 138–39. 
 248 See note 139. 
 249 See In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rec at 15527–28 ¶ 54 (finding that having uni-
form national rules is “consistent with the terms and the goals of the [Act]”).  
 250 Brown, 442 US at 136–37. 
 251 See United States Telecom Association, 359 F3d at 565–66 (striking down an 
FCC regulation that delegated authority to the states, because of “the risk that [states 
would] not share the agency’s national vision and perspective”) (quotation marks omit-
ted); Cooper and Koukoutchos, 6 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 352–55, 359 (cited in 
note 63) (emphasizing the need for federal courts to “carefully police[ ]” the “remnants of 
state regulatory authority”).  
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involved anything like the comprehensive federal regulatory re-
gime set up by the Act. Instead, those statutes created private 
rights of action for certain claims.252 
4. The policy rationale behind § 1738—and res judicata 
generally—is outweighed by federal interests in 
telecommunications regulation. 
Although the implicit repeal of § 1738 is a matter of statuto-
ry interpretation, the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated 
that it has seldom found implicit repeal because of its “assump-
tion that the weighty interests in finality and comity trump the 
interest in giving losing litigants access to an additional appel-
late tribunal.”253 Finality has a variety of benefits, as it prevents 
duplicative litigation, encourages reliance on judicial decisions, 
and unclutters the courts by reducing litigation.254 Comity em-
bodies respect for states as part of the federal system.255 But 
even on this policy level, implicit repeal of § 1738 makes sense in 
the context of the Act. 
The effect of any state court decision in later federal litiga-
tion is “strongly influenced” by the federal interests involved.256 
Federal interests are more intense when state courts apply fed-
eral substantive law like the Act.257 At least to some degree, this 
mitigates the typical rationale for treating the state court judg-
ment as res judicata.258 Furthermore, relitigation in a federal fo-
rum is most appropriate when the “legal frame of reference is an 
important element.”259 Such is the case in this context, in which 
Congress has explicitly removed authority from the states and 
transferred it to the federal government—a transfer essential to 
accomplish the goals of the Act.260 
 
 252 Specifically, the Court has rejected that § 1983, Title VII, or the Securities Ex-
change Act implicitly repeals § 1738. See note 240. 
 253 San Remo Hotel, LP v City and County of San Francisco, California, 545 US 323, 
345 (2005). See also, for example, Kremer, 456 US at 478. 
 254 See Brown, 442 US at 131. 
 255 See Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 44 (1971). 
 256 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 86, comment b (1982). 
 257 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 86, comments b, d (1982) (“If the state 
court action involved application of federal substantive law, the federal concern may be 
more intense.”). 
 258 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 86, comments b, d (1982). 
 259 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 86, comment d (1982). 
 260 See United States Telecom Association, 359 F3d at 565–66; Cooper and Koukoutchos, 
6 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 352–55 (cited in note 63) (describing states as unfit 
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Nevertheless, rejection of res judicata imposes at least some 
stress on the system of comity between state and federal 
courts.261 The interests of comity, however, are greatly weakened 
in the context of the Act. As discussed in Part III.A.2.c, applica-
tion of res judicata would enable each individual state to bind all 
other states on a given issue. In this context, adhering to the 
principle of comity has the perverse consequence of allowing one 
state to govern every other state’s telecommunications regula-
tion.262 Refusal to apply res judicata to state court judgments 
thereby gives state courts the ability to act independently of 
each other on important state issues, as the Act intends. Comity 
demands that courts in different jurisdictions give each other 
mutual respect, not that states cede their authority to one an-
other. Furthermore, since states regulate telecommunications 
services only “on behalf of Congress”263 as “arbitrators and ancil-
lary regulators within the federal system,”264 it is predominantly 
federal interests that are at issue. This is exemplified by the fact 
that federal courts refuse to invoke Burford abstention to issues 
arising under the Act,265 which applies when federal review would 
infringe on a state’s interest in managing a local problem.266 
Therefore, any relitigation in federal court does not tread on sen-
sitive state interests, and any damage to comity is minimal.267 
 
telecommunications regulators due to their lack of a national perspective and their basic 
desire to serve local interests). 
 261 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 86, comment d (1982). 
 262 See, for example, Global NAPs, 427 F3d at 48 (describing how, if res judicata ap-
plied, one state’s interpretation of an interconnection agreement could bind all other 
states on the issue). 
 263 MCI Telecommunications, 222 F3d at 343. 
 264 AT&T Communications, 238 F3d at 646.   
 265 See Illinois Bell Telephone Co v Global NAPs Illinois, Inc, 551 F3d 587, 589 (7th 
Cir 2008); Cingular Wireless, LLC v Thurston County, 150 Fed Appx 633, 635–36 (9th 
Cir 2005). 
 266 See Martin v Stewart, 499 F3d 360, 364 (4th Cir 2007): 
Burford permits abstention when federal adjudication would unduly intrude 
upon complex state administrative processes because either: (1) there are diffi-
cult questions of state law . . . whose importance transcends the result in the 
case then at bar; or (2) federal review would disrupt state efforts to establish a 
coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern. . . . 
Courts must balance the state and federal interests to determine whether the 
importance of difficult state law questions or the state interest in uniform reg-
ulation outweighs the federal interest in adjudicating the case at bar. 
(quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 267 See Younger, 401 US at 44 (describing comity as “sensitivity to the legitimate 
interests of both State and National Governments”). 
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Not only are comity interests weak in the context of the Act, 
but finality interests are weak as well. The interest in finality—
that is, in foreclosing litigants’ opportunities for a second bite at 
the apple—still retains its typical justifications of preventing forum 
shopping and avoiding potentially costly relitigation of already-
decided issues. This justification, however, is weakened in this 
context. If litigants know that federal courts have the ability to 
reevaluate a state courts’ judgment, then rational litigants that 
desire to minimize litigation costs will either bring their federal 
claims in federal court at the outset or invoke removal, avoiding 
state resolution of federal law claims altogether. Thus, overall 
litigation costs and the impact on the interest in finality should 
be minimal. 
In addition, finality in this context comes at the cost of po-
tentially forcing plaintiffs to choose between litigating state 
claims in state court or litigating federal claims in federal court, 
at the risk of being unable to do both. This is because while 
plaintiffs may attempt to avoid litigation of federal claims in 
state court, the state court may rule on them anyway. Applica-
tion of § 1738 would therefore bar litigants from being able to 
fully litigate their federal claims. This is precisely what occurred 
in Communications Telesystems.268 In that case, the plaintiff was 
forced by California law to either appeal a state agency adjudi-
cation to the California Supreme Court or lose the chance to ap-
peal its state law claims entirely.269 As a result, the plaintiff filed 
both a state appeal for its state claims—which did not include 
any federal law claims involving the Act—and a new lawsuit in 
federal court to resolve its federal claims.270 The California Su-
preme Court denied the plaintiff’s petition;271 this denial was 
functionally equivalent to a final judgment on the merits under 
state law.272 When the Ninth Circuit held that § 1738 barred re-
view of the plaintiff’s claims alleging that the state agency had 
violated the Act,273 the court effectively barred any federal or 
state court from reviewing the plaintiff’s federal claims. Applica-
tion of § 1738 and finality can thereby create a lose-lose situation 
 
 268 Note that the plaintiff in Sprint Communications was also originally forced to in-
voluntarily litigate its federal claims in state court through the misapplication of Younger 
abstention. Sprint Communications, Inc v Jacobs, 134 S Ct 584, 588–90, 593–94 (2013). 
 269 Communications Telesystems, 196 F3d at 1016–18. 
 270 Id at 1014–16. 
 271 Id at 1015. 
 272 Id at 1018–19. 
 273 Communications Telesystems, 196 F3d at 1018–19. 
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for litigants, who are forced to either involuntarily litigate their 
federal claims in state court or run the risk of having the state 
court’s decision bar federal review. It also creates situations in 
which, as in Communications Telesystems, federal claims involv-
ing the Act go entirely unreviewed. Weighing these lessened fi-
nality costs against the “enormous negative” harms to federal tel-
ecommunications regulation274 and state autonomy demonstrates 
that finality does not support the application of § 1738 and res 
judicata. 
As already discussed, application of res judicata allows a re-
turn to the state-by-state regulation that the Act was designed 
to correct.275 Telecommunications services are inherently inter-
state.276 State-by-state regulation creates instability and uncer-
tainty.277 This decreases investment and innovation by increasing 
companies’ regulatory compliance costs and generating uncertain-
ty.278 Furthermore, due to their lack of national perspective, state 
regulators are “institutionally incompetent” to regulate telecom-
munications services and externalities that are national in 
scope.279 Thus, state regulators are “doomed to reach incomplete 
and often inconsistent conclusions based on their own parochial 
interests.”280 Federal oversight is therefore essential.281 
In sum, the policy rationale behind res judicata is greatly 
weakened in the context of the Act. While implicit repeal of 
§ 1738 may have some costs for federal-state comity and for re-
moving finality from some state court decisions, these costs are 
outweighed by the overall costs of imposing res judicata. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER FEDERAL REGULATORY REGIMES 
AND RES JUDICATA 
If the 1996 Act overrides res judicata of state adjudications, 
what other federal regulatory regimes may also do so? To date, 
 
 274 GTE North, 209 F3d at 918–19 (detailing the harm of barring federal review of 
state actions).  
 275 See Illinois Bell Telephone Co v Worldcom Technologies, Inc, 179 F3d 566, 568 
(7th Cir 1999) (“Through the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Congress has opened the 
door to competing local exchange carriers and has inserted both the [FCC] and the feder-
al courts into the previously state-regulated monopoly.”). 
 276 See Cooper and Koukoutchos, 6 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 346–47, 353 (cited 
in note 63).  
 277 See id at 352–53.  
 278 See id at 352. 
 279 Id at 353–54 (emphasis omitted).  
 280 Cooper and Koukoutchos, 6 J Telecomm & High Tech L at 353 (cited in note 63).  
 281 See id at 353–55. 
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general characteristics of claims and statutes that may necessitate 
disregard or modification of res judicata have not been examined 
by scholars.282 Although the answer requires detailed analysis 
and evaluation of individual statutes, a few general characteris-
tics can be gleaned from the 1996 Act that indicate when a stat-
ute may require that federal courts be able to review state deci-
sions. These characteristics include the necessity of a uniform 
national policy to achieve a statute’s goals, limitations on state 
authority, and preservation of state authority.283 Using these 
characteristics, it may be possible to identify other statutes that 
require federal courts not be bound by state adjudications. 
A. The Statute Requires Uniformity to Function 
First, if a statute is meant to solve national problems that re-
quire uniformity, then a statute may overcome federal common 
law preclusion and implicitly repeal § 1738. Specifically, a statute 
may require federal review if allowing states to operate inde-
pendently on an issue would create opportunities for arbitrage, 
allow for cross subsidization that distorts competition, produce in-
terstate spillover effects, or result in other problematic incon-
sistency. This is likely because otherwise, without uniformity, 
the statute would not be able to accomplish its goals as intended 
by Congress. Accordingly, applying res judicata to state adjudi-
cations may create inconsistency contrary to Congress’s intent. 
One example of this is the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.284 
The Federal Aviation Act is meant to provide for both safe and 
efficient national air travel through the implementation of a uni-
form national regulatory scheme.285 This likely requires a uni-
form policy for two separate reasons. First, for safety reasons, it 
is necessary to have uniform standards governing how aircraft 
may be operated—specific flight paths, heights, takeoff and 
landing procedures, safety standards, and so forth. Because a 
 
 282 The only academic work in this area has focused on specific claims or statutes and 
has not addressed more-general considerations. See, for example, William V. Luneburg, 
Claim Preclusion as It Affects Non-parties to Clean Air Act Enforcement Actions: The 
Ghosts of Gwaltney, 10 Widener L Rev 113, 130–34 (2003) (asserting that the Clean Air Act 
may implicitly repeal § 1738); Mollie A. Murphy, The Intersystem Class Settlement: Of Comi-
ty, Consent, and Collusion, 47 U Kan L Rev 413, 486–91 (1999) (asserting that the Supreme 
Court should revisit and reverse its application of § 1738 to class action settlements). 
 283 For an explanation of how these three characteristics are embodied in the Act, 
see Part III.A.2. 
 284 Pub L No 85-726, 72 Stat 731, codified as amended at 49 USC § 40101 et seq. 
 285 See 49 USC § 40101. 
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significant portion, if not a majority, of air travel is interstate, a 
patchwork of state regulations would likely be unacceptable. A 
unified national regime of regulation is therefore necessary. Sec-
ond, because the air-travel market operates largely as a regulat-
ed oligopoly, competitive policies must be consistent.286 If airlines 
received favorable subsidization in certain states, it could allow 
them to leverage such advantages into other markets, under-
mining competition. Conversely, too few subsidies or overly re-
strictive regulation may cause certain geographic areas to be 
underserved. Thus, it would seem that a national policy is nec-
essary to achieve Congress’s goal of implementing a safe and ef-
ficient civil aviation system. Allowing state agencies and courts 
to independently interpret and implement federal policy without 
federal review could create costly inconsistency. This is why two 
circuit courts have already found federal common law preclusion 
to be inapplicable in the context of federal aviation regulation.287 
Another example is the Clean Air Act,288 which was intended 
to set a national air pollution policy.289 Without the national uni-
formity provided by the statute, responsibility for regulating air 
pollution would fall on each of the individual states. The states, 
however, are unlikely to be the best regulators of such prob-
lems.290 First, air pollution is not solely an intrastate problem.291 
One state’s air pollution can quickly become another’s. This cre-
ates a spillover problem that would be difficult and complicated 
for states to address on their own because each individual state 
may lack authority over all of the pollution sources that affect it. 
Second, air pollution is a classic collective action problem.292 
While all states together may have incentives to maintain high 
 
 286 See Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority v Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, 242 F3d 1213, 1220–21 (10th Cir 2001) (claiming that giving preclusive effect to 
state court judgments would “lead to inconsistent enforcement of the federally mandated 
assurances, potentially jeopardizing the efficiency and equality of access to our Nation’s 
air transportation system”). 
 287 See id at 1221; American Airlines, Inc v Department of Transportation, 202 F3d 
788, 800–01 (5th Cir 2000). 
 288 Pub L No 88-206, 77 Stat 392 (1963), codified as amended at 42 USC § 7401 et seq. 
 289 42 USC § 7401. 
 290 For a more in-depth discussion of why the states may not be able to effectively 
regulate air pollution, see Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean 
Air Act: A Defense of Minimum Federal Standards, 20 SLU Pub L Rev 67, 97–112 (2001). 
 291 See Robert L. Glicksman and Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on 
Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate 
Change, 102 Nw U L Rev 579, 594–96 (2008) (describing the presence of pollution exter-
nalities as justifying federal regulation). 
 292 See id at 597–98 (describing the potential for a “race to the bottom”). 
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air-quality standards, each individual state stands to benefit 
from adopting lower standards—both by imposing lower regula-
tory costs on citizens and businesses and by free riding off the 
antipollution measures taken by other states.293 Thus, allowing 
state agencies and courts to bind the EPA and federal courts 
when it comes to federal law and enforcement actions creates 
problematic inconsistency.294 
B. The Statute Prohibits States from Acting Inconsistently 
with Federal Policy 
The second characteristic that may signal Congress’s intent 
to allow for federal review is that the statute prohibits states 
from acting inconsistently with federal policy. If the statute con-
tains provisions that explicitly limit actions that states may take 
or creates federal guidelines for states to act in accordance with, 
then the statute may require federal review of state adjudica-
tions. In many ways, this characteristic is simply another mani-
festation of the first: to successfully implement a uniform na-
tional policy means that the states cannot act in ways contrary 
to that policy. Nevertheless, explicit limitations on state author-
ity can be independently indicative of congressional intent to 
permit federal review of state adjudications—review that is nec-
essary to ensure that the states do not exceed the bounds of 
their authority. 
The Clean Air Act is again a good example of this. Specifi-
cally, 42 USC § 7416 prohibits the states from enforcing emis-
sions standards that are less stringent than the federal stand-
ards. If, for example, state agencies or courts began crafting 
exceptions or enforcing looser standards than the federal policy 
calls for, then applying res judicata to those decisions would 
frustrate that federal policy. States may have incentives to shirk 
the burden of enforcing costly regulation in order to stimulate 
business or appease voters.295 Thus, each state agency and court 
may have somewhat perverse incentives to undermine federal 
 
 293 Note that the externality problems presented here are analogous to the problems 
present in the telecommunications context. See Cooper and Koukoutchos, 6 J Telecomm 
& High Tech L at 353–55 (cited in note 63). 
 294 For a more detailed version of this argument, see Luneburg, 10 Widener L Rev at 
130–34 (cited in note 282). 
 295 Williams, 20 SLU Pub L Rev at 107–09 (cited in note 290) (asserting that “feder-
al environmental standards . . . prevent states from competing with each other for eco-
nomic activity by relaxing environmental standards and thereby offering lower location 
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regulation. If a state agency or court allowed a polluter to avoid 
punishment for regulatory infractions, allowing such a decision 
to bar a subsequent suit in federal court would violate the stat-
ute’s restrictions on state authority.296 Such a limitation there-
fore suggests that state adjudications may not be res judicata in 
federal court under the statute.297 
C. The Statute Preserves Authority among the Individual 
States 
Finally, if a statute preserves authority for states to act in-
dependently on a given issue, then it may indicate that the stat-
ute necessitates that res judicata does not apply to federal re-
view. Application of res judicata could prevent states from acting 
independently if one state decided an issue and then another 
state tried to act differently.298 This, however, is entirely de-
pendent on what issues state agencies and courts may be re-
viewing, because not all preservations of state authority will ne-
cessitate federal review. If the state adjudications are 
themselves fact dependent, then such decisions may not bind 
other states, given the unique nature of each litigation. Indeed, 
for a strong majority of legal issues, one state court’s decision is 
not binding on other courts. This problem exists in telecommu-
nications regulation because of the numerous identical questions 
of law and fact that predominate the field—for example, inter-
connection agreements can be verbatim from state to state, so 
that one state’s interpretation of an agreement has the potential 
to bind a later state.299 As a result, issues for which states are 
likely to address common questions of law or identical factual 
problems are most likely to feature this characteristic. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1996 Act revolutionized telecommunications in many 
ways. The Act moved regulation away from protecting monopolists 
to mandating competition. Further, it flipped telecommunications 
 
 296 See, for example, 42 USC § 7416 (providing that a state cannot “enforce any 
emission standard . . . less stringent” than the federal standard). 
 297 Arapahoe County, 242 F3d at 1219–20 (holding that “common law doctrines ex-
tending full faith and credit to state court determinations” do not apply when those de-
terminations are “contrary to important and established federal policy”). 
 298 See note 211 and accompanying text. 
 299 See, for example, Global NAPs, 427 F3d at 43, 47–49 (explaining that individual 
state courts have decisionmaking authority over identical interconnection agreements). 
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regulation on its head by transferring authority from the states to 
the federal government. In these ways, the Act upended long-
standing, traditional regulation. One of these traditions is the 
federal courts’ application of res judicata to state adjudications. 
In the Act, Congress manifested its intent to implement a uni-
form federal telecommunications policy. The Act protects this 
important goal of uniformity by restricting states from acting in 
any way that contravenes federal regulation. At the same time, 
the Act preserves for the states the ability to regulate certain is-
sues that do not affect federal policy. Application of res judicata 
would conflict with and undermine these important principles 
and provisions of the Act. Accordingly, federal common law 
should not bind federal courts to the results of state agency adju-
dications. Further, though implicit repeals are exceedingly rare, 
the Act presents a strong case that the Court should recognize 
implicit repeal of § 1738 in this context. 
These three characteristics of the Act—the necessity of a 
uniform policy, the limitation of states’ authority, and the 
preservation of states’ authority—that reflect Congress’s intent 
to allow federal review are also generally applicable to other 
statutes beyond the 1996 Act. Although any analysis of congres-
sional intent requires in-depth review on a case-by-case basis, 
these characteristics are useful indicators of statutes that poten-
tially necessitate that state adjudications not preclude federal 
review. 
